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INTRODUCTION

O

n September 28, 1945, President Harry S. Truman issued two presidential proclamations that would forever change the landscape of the world’s
oceans. First, the United States claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the “the
natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath
the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States.” 1 The character of the waters above the continental shelf as high seas and the right of
all nations to “free and unimpeded navigation” in and over those waters,
however, were not affected by the proclamation. 2 Second, the United States
claimed the authority to unilaterally establish fisheries conservation zones in
areas of the high seas contiguous to the U.S. coast, under the exclusive regulation and control of the United States, where “fishing activities have been
or in the future may be developed and maintained on a substantial scale.” 3
This unilateral assault on freedom of the high seas soon resulted in a
proliferation of excessive maritime claims that not only claimed exclusive
jurisdiction over offshore living and non-living resources, but also sovereignty over the water column beyond the traditional three nautical mile territorial sea limit. To address this growing uneasiness at sea, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution on February 21,
1957, with the view of creating a more stable legal order for the oceans and
promoting better use and management of its resources. Based on a recommendation of the International Law Commission, the General Assembly decided to convene the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea to examine the state of the law, considering the legal, technical, biological, economic, and political aspects of the problem, and to codify the results
of the Conference in one or more international instruments as appropriate. 4
Eighty-six States participated in the Conference and adopted four separate
conventions on October 31, 1958: (1) the Convention on the Territorial Sea

1. Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28,
1945).
2. Id.
3. Proclamation No. 2668, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,304 (Sept. 28, 1945).
4. G.A. Res. 1105 (XI) (Feb. 21, 1957).
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and the Contiguous Zone; 5 (2) the Convention on the High Seas; 6 (3)
the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas; 7 and (4) the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 8 The Conference also adopted an Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. 9
Although the 1958 Conventions were a significant achievement, making
a historic contribution to the codification and progressive development of
the law of the sea, they did not resolve all outstanding issues. As a result, on
December 10, 1958, the UNGA requested that the Secretary-General convene a Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to consider
“questions on the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits,” which had
not been settled in the 1958 Conventions. 10 The Conference convened on
March 17, 1960, but concluded on April 26, 1960, without resolving the outstanding issues.
On December 18, 1967, the UNGA established an ad hoc committee of
thirty-six member States to study the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and the
ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 11 The Ad Hoc Committee completed its work in 1968 and submitted its study to the UNGA.
Based on the Committee’s report, the UNGA established the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction, comprised of forty-two member States, on December
21, 1968. 12 Two years later, the UNGA decided to convene the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1973, and instructed the Committee to act as the preparatory body for the conference. 13
Based on the work of the Committee between 1971 and 1973, the UNGA

5. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
6. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 11.
7. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
8. Convention of the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
9. Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 169.
10. G.A. Res. 1307 (XIII) (Dec. 10, 1958).
11. G.A. Res. 2340 (XXII) (Dec. 18, 1967).
12. G.A. Res. 2467A (XXIII) (Dec. 21, 1968).
13. G.A. Res. 2750C (XXV) (Dec. 17, 1970).
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requested the Secretary-General to convene the first two sessions of UNCLOS III in 1973 and 1974. 14 Following the first session, the UNGA decided that the mandate of the Conference would be “to adopt a convention
dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea.” 15
The Conference held eleven sessions between 1973 and 1982 and was
attended by 160 States. After nine years of painstaking debate, the Conference completed its work and adopted the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on December 10, 1982. 16 Hailed as “A Constitution for the Oceans,” the Convention was immediately signed by 119
States, a remarkable number given the contentious and complex nature of
the negotiations. 17 But support for the Convention soon began to unravel.
By 1993, the Convention had still not entered into force, primarily over concerns by the industrialized nations over Part XI on deep seabed mining.
Realizing that the Convention would not achieve universal acceptance
without modifications to Part XI, the Secretary-General convened fifteen
informal meetings beginning in July 1990 and culminating on July 28, 1994,
with the adoption of the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part
XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982 (Part XI Implementation Agreement). 18 Article 2 of the Part XI Implementation Agreement provides that it will be interpreted and applied together with UNCLOS as a single instrument. 19 Four months later, on November 16, 1994, UNCLOS entered into force, followed by entry into force
of the Part XI Implementation Agreement on July 28, 1996. As of June 2022,
UNCLOS and the Implementation Agreement have 168 and 151 parties, respectively.

14. G.A. Res. 3029A (XXVII) (Dec. 18, 1972).
15. G.A. Res. 3067 (XXVIII), ¶ 3 (Nov. 16, 1973).
16. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
17. Tommy T.B. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans (Dec. 11, 1982) (remarks by the President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea), https://
www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf [hereinafter Koh,
A Constitution for the Oceans].
18. U.N. Secretary-General, Consultations of the Secretary-General on Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N.
Doc. A/48/950 (June 9, 1994).
19. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3.
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The intent of the Conference had been to produce a comprehensive and
universally accepted convention, covering every aspect of the uses and resources of the oceans, that would stand the test of time. Was it successful?
At the final session, Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, President of
the Third Conference, answered that question in the affirmative for the following reasons:
UNCLOS promotes international peace and security by replacing the
plethora of conflicting claims with universally agreed limits on the various
maritime zones;
• UNCLOS enables freedom of navigation by its compromises on the
status of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and by the regimes of innocent
passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage;
• UNCLOS creates the EEZ, which enhances conservation and the optimum utilization of the living resources of the oceans;
• UNCLOS contains new rules for the protection and preservation of
the marine environment from pollution;
• UNCLOS contains new rules on marine scientific research (MSR) that
strike an equitable balance between the interests of research States and
coastal States;
• UNCLOS’ mandatory dispute settlement system advances the peaceful
settlement of disputes and prevents the use of force in the settlement of
disputes;
• UNCLOS confirms that the resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of mankind by creating fair and workable institutions and arrangements; and
• UNCLOS provisions reflect international equity—for example, revenue sharing from the resources of the extended continental shelf, granting
land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States access to the living resources in the EEZ of their neighbors, balancing the interests of coastal and
distant-water fishermen, and sharing the benefits derived from deep seabed
mining. 20
•

Was Ambassador Koh correct in his assessment of the Convention? Has
UNCLOS stood the test of time as a comprehensive treaty that is respected
by all nations? This article analyzes the various provisions of UNCLOS,
based on forty years of State practice, to determine whether the rules-based
20. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, supra note 17.
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legal order codified in the Convention has stood the test of time. While many
of the provisions of the Convention have had their desired effect of preserving navigational rights and freedoms for the international community by curtailing the plethora of conflicting coastal State claims that existed prior to
1982, an equal number of provisions have failed miserably in achieving their
intended effect. This failure has given rise to a new era of excessive maritime
claims by coastal States that purport to restrict freedom of the seas, thereby
increasing tensions and diminishing international peace and security. The article concludes by examining how the international community should respond to this new wave of excessive claims.
II.

BENEFITS OF THE CONVENTION

There are clearly provisions of the Convention that have had a positive impact on maintaining a rules-based legal order for the oceans that balances
coastal State rights and user State rights in the littorals. UNCLOS clarifies
the maximum breadth of the territorial sea. It assures unimpeded transit
rights through international straits and archipelagic waters. It reaffirms the
sovereign immunity of warships and other government-owned or operated
noncommercial vessels. It grants coastal States exclusive resource rights in
their EEZ and continental shelf. It provides clear guidance on the conduct
of MSR in foreign EEZs and on the high seas. It enhances the protection
and preservation of the marine environment. It establishes a mechanism for
the adjudication of extended continental shelf claims by the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf. It creates an independent judicial body,
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which has jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention.
A. Breadth of the Territorial Sea
UNCLOS conclusively settled the long-standing dispute concerning the
maximum breadth of the territorial sea. Traditionally, the breadth of the territorial sea was limited to three nautical miles. 21 By 1974, however, only
twenty-eight States claimed a three-nautical-mile territorial sea, while eighty-

21. Tullio Treves, Historical Development of the Law of the Sea, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
1, 5 (Donald Rothwell et al. eds., 2015).

OF THE LAW OF THE SEA

879

International Law Studies

2022

eight States claimed territorial seas ranging from four to two hundred nautical miles. 22 UNCLOS resolved the issue by establishing the maximum
breadth of the territorial sea at twelve nautical miles, thereby stabilizing State
practice and discouraging excessive claims. 23 Of the twenty States that
claimed territorial seas in excess of twelve nautical miles in 1983, thirteen
reduced their claims to twelve nautical miles by 2011. 24 Only Benin, Peru,
Somalia, and Togo continue to claim territorial seas exceeding twelve nautical miles, compared to 144 States that claim a twelve-nautical-mile territorial
sea, two that claim a six-nautical-mile territorial sea, and one that claims a
three-nautical-mile territorial sea. 25
B. Transit Passage
Prior to UNCLOS, most strategic chokepoints, like the Straits of Gibraltar,
Hormuz, and Malacca, contained a high seas corridor that allowed for free
and unimpeded transit for all surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. With
the expansion of the maximum breadth of the territorial sea from three to
twelve nautical miles, more than one hundred of these straits used for international navigation are today overlapped by territorial seas. Under the prevailing law of the time, these straits would be governed by the regime of
innocent passage, which does not include a right of overflight for aircraft or
submerged transit for submarines. 26 As a compromise, UNCLOS balances
coastal States’ interest in expanding their territorial seas with the international community’s interest in unimpeded navigation and overflight on, over,
and under these strategic waterways.
In straits used for international navigation between one part of the high
seas or EEZ and another part of the high seas or EEZ, that are completely
overlapped by territorial seas of the bordering States, all ships and aircraft
enjoy the non-suspendable right of transit passage. 27 Moreover, bordering
22. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 136 (3d ed.
2012).
23. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 3.
24. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22, at 136; see generally U.S. Department of Defense,
Maritime Claims Reference Manual, https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_
mcrm.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2022) [hereinafter MCRM].
25. See MCRM, supra note 24.
26. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone arts. 2, 14, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. No. 1606, T.I.A.S No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter 1958 Territorial
Sea Convention].
27. UNCLOS, supra note 16, arts. 37, 38, 44.
880

Reflecting on UNCLOS Forty Years Later

Vol. 99

States may not adopt laws or regulations that have the practical effect of
denying, hampering, or impairing the right of transit passage. 28 That means
surface ships, submarines, and aircraft have an unimpeded right of transit
through the strait for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit in
their normal mode of operation as a matter of right, without bordering State
notice or consent. 29 “Normal mode of operation” means that submarines
may transit submerged, military aircraft may overfly in combat formation
and with normal equipment operation, and surface ships may transit in a
manner consistent with vessel security, to include formation steaming and
launch and recovery of aircraft, if consistent with sound navigational practices.
The right of transit passage is therefore fundamental to naval and air
forces of all nations for both routine and contingency operations. For example, Operation El Dorado Canyon, the U.S. response to the April 5, 1986,
terrorist bombing of the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin that killed an
American soldier and wounded two hundred other people, was facilitated by
the right of transit passage. France and Spain denied the United States overflight rights over their territory to conduct the operation. U.S. F-111s and
EF-111s based in Great Britain (RAF Lakenheath and RAF Heyford) were
therefore forced to enter the Mediterranean Sea through the Strait of Gibraltar, a 3,500-mile flight each way with aerial refueling, to conduct strikes
against terrorist targets in Libya, in coordination with U.S. Navy aircraft off
the USS Coral Sea (CV 43) and USS America (CV 66) operating off the coast
of Libya. 30
The regime of transit passage enjoys near universal recognition. Only
Iran and Malaysia have contrary positions. Iran signed but has not ratified
UNCLOS. 31 At the time the Islamic Republic signed UNCLOS in 1982, it
declared that many of the provisions of the Convention, including Article
38, which describes the right of transit passage, do not reflect customary
28. Id. art. 42.
29. Id. arts. 38, 39, 44.
30. Gregory Ball, 1986—Operation El Dorado Canyon, AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SUPPORT
DIVISION (Sept. 8, 2012), https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458
950/operation-el-dorado-canyon/; Fred Heyford, U.S. Attack on Libya: A Raid That Went
Right, WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 20, 1986), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/04/20/us-attack-on-libya-a-raid-that-went-right/23336af6-dfde-4ce7928c-c170d42b6654/.
31. U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/UNCLOS%20Status%20table_ENG.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2022).
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international law. Specifically, Iran claims that the right of transit passage
through straits used for international navigation, like the Strait of Hormuz,
is a contractual right limited to State parties to the Convention. 32 As the sole
entrance to the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz is one of the most critical
chokepoints in the world. The United States rejects Iran’s position and considers that the regime of transit passage is “clearly based on customary practice of long standing and reflects the balance of rights and interests among
all States, regardless of whether they have signed or ratified the Convention.” 33 Accordingly, commercial and military ships and aircraft of all nations
routinely exercise the right of transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz. 34
Malaysia also impedes transit passage through the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore, but only for certain ships. Beginning in the 1990s, large cargoes
of high-level nuclear waste were transported between Japan and France on
board ships owned by British Nuclear Fuels Limited. Concerned that these
shipments could endanger coastal communities and cause long-term damage
to the marine environment in the event of a casualty, some coastal and island
States along the routes used by British Nuclear Fuels Limited objected to the
transport of nuclear material through their territorial seas and EEZs without
prior notification and consent. 35 Malaysian officials further stated that such
vessels would not have access to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore without prior authorization, claiming that there were “gaps in the legal regimes
governing these activities” and that there were no agreements in place “regarding salvage responsibilities, liability for damages, obligations to consult,
advance notification and contingency planning to handle emergencies.” 36
Despite this purported restriction, all other ships, including nuclear-powered
32. U.N. Treaty Collection, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X
XI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en#EndDec (last updated June 27, 2022).
33. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112, UNITED STATES RESPONSES
TO EXCESSIVE NATIONAL MARITIME CLAIMS 68 (Mar. 9, 1992).
34. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 114, IRAN’S MARITIME CLAIMS 24
(Mar. 16, 1994).
35. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Legal Regime Governing Sea Transport of Ultrahazardous Radioactive
Materials, 33 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 78–80 (2002).
36. Id. at 86; see also Statement by Datuk Law Hieng Ding, Malaysian Minister of Science,
Technology and Environment, Carriage of Ultra Hazardous Radioactive Cargo by Sea: Implications and Responses, delivered by Deputy Minister Dato’ Abu Bakar Bin Daud at the
Meeting of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (Oct. 18, 1999), in 8 MIMA BULLETIN 1, 3
(2000).
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warships, continue to enjoy an unimpeded right of transit passage through
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.
Other nations, like Canada, Russia, and China, do not recognize transit
passage rights in certain straits, not because they question the legality of the
regime but because they do not consider the strait to be a strait used for
international navigation under Part III, Section 2, of the Convention. The
failure of UNCLOS to rollback these illegal claims will be discussed in Part
III, below.
C. Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage
Prior to 1982, international law did not recognize the right of mid-oceanic
island States to claim archipelagic status. During the Third UN Conference,
maritime States worked closely with island States to craft an agreement that
allowed mid-oceanic island States, like Indonesia and the Philippines, to
claim archipelagic status and guaranteed the right of all States to freely navigate through the archipelago. For the most part, State practice by archipelagic States has complied with Part IV of the Convention.
An archipelagic State is a nation comprised wholly of one or more archipelagoes and may include other islands. 37 UNCLOS defines an “archipelago”
as a group of islands, interconnecting waters, and other natural features that
are closely interrelated and form an intrinsic geographical, economic, and
political entity. 38 Thus, continental nations (e.g., the United States) may not
assert archipelagic status for their claimed mid-ocean island (e.g., Hawaiian
Islands). Nonetheless, China, Denmark, Ecuador, France, the Netherlands,
Norway, and the United Kingdom purport to draw straight baselines around
their claimed mid-ocean island territories and dependencies that are akin to
a claim of archipelagic status. The illegality of these assertions and inability
of UNCLOS to influence States to modify these excessive claims is discussed
in Part III, below.
A nation that qualifies as an archipelagic State may draw straight baselines joining the outermost points of its outermost islands if the ratio of water to land within the baselines is between 1:1 and 9:1. 39 Thus, even if a State
is an island nation it must still meet the water-to-land ratio. So, Australia,
Japan, and the United Kingdom, for example, cannot claim archipelagic status because they have too much land territory. The waters enclosed within
37. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 46.
38. Id.
39. Id. art. 47.
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an archipelago’s straight baselines are archipelagic waters, which are subject
to archipelagic State sovereignty. 40 Archipelagic baselines are also used to
measure the archipelagic State’s maritime zones. 41
Archipelagic States may, but are not required to, designate archipelagic
sea lanes (ASL) through their archipelagic waters suitable for continuous and
expeditious passage of ships and aircraft. All normal routes used for international navigation and overflight are to be included in the designation and
must be adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 42 If the
archipelagic State does not designate, or makes only a partial designation of
ASLs, vessels and aircraft of all States may continue to exercise the right of
archipelagic sea lanes passage (ASLP) in all normal passage routes used for
international navigation and overflight through the archipelago. 43
ASLP applies within archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea
whether the archipelagic State has designated ASLs or not and is virtually
identical to the transit passage regime. It includes the rights of navigation
and overflight in the normal mode of operation solely for the purpose of
continuous, expeditious, and unobstructed transit through archipelagic waters. As in the case of transit passage, normal mode includes submerged
transit by submarines; launching and recovery of aircraft and military devices
for force protection; formation flying and steaming for force protection; and
replenishment at sea and air-to-air refueling. All military and commercial
ships and aircraft enjoy the right of ASLP while transiting through, under,
or over archipelagic waters and adjacent territorial seas via all normal passage
routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight. 44 The right
of innocent passage applies in archipelagic waters not covered by the ASLP
regime. 45
Archipelagic States may not impede or suspend the right of ASLP for
any reason. 46 Additionally, there is no requirement for ships or aircraft to
request diplomatic clearance or provide prior notice or receive consent from
the archipelagic State to engage in ASLP. Archipelagic States may adopt laws
40. Id. art. 49.
41. Id. art. 48.
42. Id. art. 49.
43. Id. art. 53(12); IMO, Guidance for Ships Transiting Archipelagic Waters, IMO Doc.
SN/Circ.206/Corr.1 (Mar. 1, 1999); IMO Res. MSC.71(69) (May 19, 1998); IMO Res.
MSC.72(69) (May 19, 1998); IMO, Guidance for Ships Transiting Archipelagic Waters, IMO
Doc. SN/Circ. 206, ¶ 2.1.1 (Mar. 1, 1999).
44. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 53.
45. Id. art. 52.
46. Id. arts. 44, 54.
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and regulations relating to ASLP, but these laws and regulations shall not
discriminate in form or in fact among foreign ships and shall not have the
practical effect of denying, hampering, or impairing the right of ASLP. 47
Only two of the twenty-two States that claim archipelagic status restrict the
right of ASLP. The Dominican Republic does not recognize the right of
ASLP, 48 while the Maldives limits ASLP to designated sea lanes, which have
not yet been specified, and prohibits all overflight in ASLs. 49
Twenty-two States currently claim archipelagic status: Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Cabo Verde, Comoros, the Dominican Republic, Fiji,
Grenada, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kiribati, the Maldives, the Marshall Islands,
Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Sao Tome & Principe, the Seychelles, the Solomon Islands, Trinidad
& Tobago, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 50 The U.S. State and Defense Departments
have examined seventeen of these claims and have only found five to be
inconsistent with the provisions of UNCLOS, Part IV—Comoros, the Dominican Republic, the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, and Mauritius. 51
To date, the only archipelagic State that has designated ASLs is Indonesia. When it introduced its proposal before the Maritime Safety Committee,
Indonesia confirmed that the proposed designation was a “partial” ASL proposal and that the right of ASLP would continue to apply in “all other normal passage routes used for international navigation and overflight . . . including an east-west route and other associated spurs and connectors,
through and over Indonesia’s territorial sea and its archipelagic waters.” 52
The IMO therefore adopted Indonesia’s ASL proposal as a “partial system”
because it did not include all normal routes used for international navigation

47. Id. arts. 42, 44, 54.
48. Dominican Republic, Act 66-07, art. 12 (May 22, 2007), https://www.un.org/
Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DOM_ 2007_Act_frombulletin65.pdf.
49. Maldives, Maritime Zones of Maldives Act No. 6/96, arts. 12, 15 (1996), https://
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/MDV_
1996_Act.pdf.
50. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22, at 24.
51. See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, Limits in the
Seas, https://www.state.gov/limits-in-the-seas/; MCRM, supra note 24.
52. IMO Maritime Safety Committee, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO
Doc. MSC 69/22, ¶ 5.23.2 (May 29, 1998); see also IMO Maritime Safety Committee, Report
of the Maritime Safety Committee, IMO Doc. MSC 77/26, ¶ 25.40 (June 10, 2003).
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as required by UNCLOS Article 53. 53 Relevant IMO documents reflect that
where a partial ASL proposal has come into effect, the right of ASLP “may
continue to be exercised through all normal passage routes used for international navigation or overflight in other parts of archipelagic waters” in accordance with UNCLOS. 54
D. Sovereign Immunity
Under customary international law, warships, naval auxiliaries, and military
aircraft, as well as all State owned or operated vessels and aircraft in noncommercial service, are entitled to sovereign immunity. Such vessels and aircraft, wherever located, are immune from arrest, seizure, search, and inspection by the authorities of another State. Therefore, while in port or at sea,
local authorities may not board a sovereign immune ship or aircraft without
the permission of the commanding officer. Such vessels and aircraft are also
immune from foreign taxation and have exclusive control over passengers
and crew onboard with respect to acts performed on board. Sovereign immunity additionally allows the commander or master of a ship or aircraft to
protect the identity of personnel, stores, weapons, or other property on
board. Warships may be required to comply with some coastal State laws and
regulations promulgated in conformity with UNCLOS, but failure to comply
is subject only to a diplomatic protest by the aggrieved State and an order to
leave its territorial sea immediately.
UNCLOS meticulously codifies this long-standing principle of international law. Article 32 provides that nothing in the Convention “affects the

53. IMO Res. MSC.72(69), Adoption, Designation, and Substitution of Archipelagic
Sea Lanes (May 19, 1998); IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its SixtyNinth Session, IMO Doc. MSC 69/22/Add.1, Annex 8 (June 1, 1998) (Annex 8 is IMO
Res. MSC.71(69), Adoption of Amendments to the General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing,
adopted on May 19, 1998); See also IMO, Adoption, Designation, and Substitution of Archipelagic Sea Lanes, IMO Doc. SN/Circ.200 (May 26, 1998); IMO, Adoption, Designation,
and Substitution of Archipelagic Sea Lanes, IMO Doc. SN/Circ.200/Add.1 (July 3, 2008);
IMO, Adoption, Designation, and Substitution of Archipelagic Sea Lanes, IMO Doc.
SN/Circ.202 (July 31, 2008).
54. IMO Res. MSC.71(69), Adoption of Amendments to the General Provisions on
Ships’ Routeing, ¶ 6.7 (May 19, 1998); IMO, Guidance for Ships Transiting Archipelagic
Waters, IMO Doc. SN/Circ.206 ¶ 2.1.1 (Mar. 1, 1999).
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immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.” 55 Articles 95 and 96 reflect the generally accepted principle that warships and ships owned or operated by a State and used only on
government non-commercial service on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. 56 The rule
reflected in these articles applies in all waters seaward of the territorial sea. 57
If a sovereign immune vessel fails to comply with coastal State laws and
regulations concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards a
request by the coastal State to comply therewith, the coastal State may only
require the sovereign immune vessel to leave the territorial sea immediately. 58
Use of force by a coastal State to require a sovereign immune vessel to leave
its territorial sea is not permitted unless required in self-defense. Of course,
the flag State bears “international responsibility for any loss or damage to
the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea
or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international
law.” 59
Consistent with Articles 95 and 96, sovereign immune vessels may not
be boarded by a foreign warship pursuant to the right of visit. 60 Additionally,
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft are exempt from compliance with the
environmental provisions of the Convention. The only requirement is that
States shall ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing
operations or operational capabilities, that their sovereign immune vessels
and aircraft act in a manner that is consistent with the Convention so far as
is reasonable and practicable. 61 Finally, a State is permitted to file a declaration in writing that it does not accept the compulsory dispute settlement

55. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 32.
56. Id. arts. 95, 96.
57. Article 58(2) provides that “Articles 88 to 115 . . . apply to the exclusive economic
zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.” Id. art. 58(2). The second sentence
of Article 86 provides that Part VII on the high seas does not abridge the “freedoms enjoyed
by all States in the exclusive economic zone in accordance with article 58.” Id. art. 86.
58. Id. art. 30.
59. Id. art. 31.
60. Id. art. 110.
61. Id. art. 236.
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provisions of the Convention to apply to, inter alia, disputes concerning military activities and law enforcement activities regarding marine scientific research or fisheries matters. 62
The issue of sovereign immunity and the military exception in Article
298 have been addressed by both ITLOS and arbitration tribunals established pursuant to UNCLOS. In the ARA Libertad case, ITLOS applied the
time-honored principle of sovereign immunity in deciding the case. On October 1, 2012, the Argentine warship ARA Libertad entered the port of Tema,
Ghana. The frigate was due to depart Tema on October 4 but could not due
to an injunction issued by a Ghanaian court seeking to enforce a civil judgment against Argentina won by a Cayman Islands company in a U.S. federal
court. Subsequently, on October 30, 2012, Argentina instituted arbitration
proceedings against Ghana. Two weeks later, on November 14, 2012, Argentina requested that ITLOS prescribe provisional measures under Article
290(5) of the Convention.
In deciding the case, ITLOS acknowledged that warships express the
sovereignty of the flag State and enjoy complete immunity, even in internal
waters. The tribunal also noted that the actions taken by Ghana to prevent
the Argentine warship from discharging its missions and duties affect the
warship’s immunity under general international law. Additionally, the attempts by Ghanaian authorities to board the Libertad and forcibly move it to
another berth without the consent of the commanding officer demonstrated
the seriousness of the situation and the urgent need for provisional measures.
Accordingly, the tribunal unanimously granted the provisional measures and
ordered that Ghana unconditionally release the Libertad and ensure that the
frigate, its commanding officer, and crew be allowed to leave the port of
Tema, as well as other Ghanaian maritime areas, and that the frigate be resupplied to that end. 63
Sovereign immunity was also raised in the Kerch Strait (Ukraine v. Russia)
case. On November 25, 2018, the Ukrainian naval vessels Berdyansk, Nikopol,
and Yani Kapu, and their crews, were arrested and detained by Russian authorities as they attempted to transit through the Kerch Strait enroute to the
Ukrainian port of Berdyansk in the Sea of Azov. As the two artillery boats
and the naval tugboat approached the strait, they were informed by the Russian Coast Guard that the strait was closed. The Ukrainians ignored the notice and informed Russian authorities that they intended to proceed through
62. Id. art. 298.
63. “ARA Libertad” (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 2012, ITLOS
Rep. 2012, at 332, ¶¶ 94–99, 108.
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the strait, but they were blocked by Russian Coast Guard vessels and forced
to turn around. As they navigated away from the strait, Russian Coast Guard
vessels pursued the Ukrainian ships. During the pursuit, a Coast Guard vessel opened fire on the Berdyansk, wounding three crew members and damaging the vessel. The three Ukrainian vessels and their crews were then seized
and detained by the Russian Coast Guard and taken to the port of Kerch.
The twenty-four crew members were apprehended, detained, and charged
with a violation of Article 322, Section 2, of the Criminal Code of the Russian
Federation as persons suspected of having committed a crime of aggravated
illegal crossing of the State border of the Russian Federation. 64
On April 16, 2019, Ukraine filed a request for the prescription of provisional measures with ITLOS requesting that the tribunal: (1) indicate provisional measures requiring the Russian Federation to promptly release the
three Ukrainian naval vessels and return them to the Ukraine; (2) suspend
criminal proceedings against the twenty-four Ukrainian servicemen and refrain from initiating new proceedings; and (3) release the twenty-four servicemen and allow them to return to Ukraine. The Russian Federation refused to participate in the hearing. 65 When Russia ratified UNCLOS, it declared, in accordance with Article 298, that it did not accept compulsory dispute settlement for disputes concerning military activities and law-enforcement activities regarding the exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction. 66
Regarding the military activities’ exception, ITLOS determined that the
case involved the use of force in the context of a law enforcement operation
rather than a military operation and that Article 298(1)(b) did not apply. 67 In
the tribunal’s opinion, the “distinction between military and law enforcement
activities cannot be based solely on whether naval vessels or law enforcement
vessels are employed in the activities in question.” 68 Furthermore, the distinction between military and law enforcement activities cannot “be based
solely on the characterization of the activities in question by the parties to a
dispute.” 69 Rather, the distinction “must be based primarily on an objective
evaluation of the nature of the activities in question, taking into account the

64. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Provisional Measures, Order of May 25, 2019, ITLOS Rep. 2019, at 283, ¶¶ 30–32.
65. Id. ¶¶ 1, 24–25.
66. Id. ¶ 49.
67. Id. ¶¶ 74, 77.
68. Id. ¶ 64.
69. Id. ¶ 65.
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relevant circumstances in each case.” 70 The tribunal concluded that the arrest
and detention of the Ukrainian vessels suggest that the Russian actions took
place in the context of a law enforcement operation. 71 This conclusion was
further supported by the subsequent proceedings and charges against the
crew that they had unlawfully crossed the Russian boarder and that Russia
had detained the Ukrainian vessels for failure to comply with Russian laws
and regulations. 72
Concerning the status of the Ukrainian vessels, ITLOS determined that
the Berdyansk and Nikopol were warships within the meaning of Article 29 of
UNCLOS and that the Yani Kapu was a government-owned or operated ship
used only on non-commercial service as referred to in Article 96 of UNCLOS. Thus, the Ukrainian vessels enjoyed immunity under the Convention
and general international law and any action affecting the immunity of warships can cause “serious harm to the dignity and sovereignty of a State and
has the potential to undermine its national security.” 73 Consequently, the
“actions taken by the Russian Federation could irreparably prejudice the
rights claimed by Ukraine to the immunity of its naval vessels and their servicemen.” 74 According, the tribunal granted the following provisional
measures: (1) immediate release of the Ukrainian naval vessels and return to
Ukraine; (2) immediate release of the twenty-four detained Ukrainian servicemen and return to Ukraine; and (3) no action from the Russian Federation that might aggravate or extend the dispute. 75
Thus, the terms of the Convention and its implementation have honored
the long-standing customary international law principle of sovereign immunity of warships, State aircraft, and other government-owned or operated noncommercial vessels and aircraft, as well as the exclusive jurisdiction of the
flag State.
E. Exclusive Economic Zone
Unlike the other maritime zones, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a
creation of the Convention. Articles 55 and 86 make clear that the zone is
not part of the territorial sea nor the high seas, but rather is a sui generis
70. Id. ¶ 66.
71. Id. ¶ 75.
72. Id. ¶ 76.
73. Id. ¶¶ 96–102, 110.
74. Id. ¶ 111.
75. Id. ¶ 124.
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regime established by the Convention. 76 The EEZ has its origins in several
post-WWII proclamations by the United States, 77 Latin American States, 78
and several Arab States. 79 All of these edicts asserted jurisdiction over resources but maintained freedom of navigation in the superjacent waters of
the claimed seabed areas.
The first international instrument to proclaim a two hundred nautical
mile zone was the Santiago Declaration, signed by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru
on August 18, 1952. 80 The driving force behind the declaration was resource
exploitation, vesting sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters and
the seabed and subsoil (at a minimum) within two hundred nautical miles off
their coasts. Unlike the previous proclamations that maintained freedom of
navigation, the Santiago Declaration only allowed for the right of innocent
passage through the zone. 81
In 1970, nine Latin American States—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay—signed the Montevideo Declaration establishing exclusive resource jurisdiction in the waters and
the seabed and subsoil off their coasts out to an undefined limit. 82 The declaration did, however, maintain freedom of navigation and overflight for all
ships and aircraft in “areas under their maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction.” 83 Three months later, five other States—Colombia, the Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico—joined the signatories of the
76. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 55 (“The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond
and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part,
under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of
other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention”); art. 86 (“The
provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic
waters of an archipelagic State”).
77. Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 1; Proclamation No. 2668, supra note 3.
78. See Presidential Declaration Concerning Continental Shelf of June 23, 1947, EL MERCURIO, June 29, 1947 (Chile); Presidential Decree No. 781 of August 1, 1947, 107 EL PERUANO:
DIARIO OFICIAL, No. 1983, Aug. 11, 1947 (Peru).
79. Saudi Arabia, May 28, 1949; Bahrain, June 5, 1949; Qatar, June 8, 1949; Abu Dhabi,
June 10, 1949; Kuwait, June 12, 1949; Dubai, June 14, 1949; Sharjah, June 16, 1949; Ras al
Khaimah, June 17, 1949; Umm al Qaiwain, June 20, 1949; Ajman, June 20, 1949; See Idrīs
Ḍaḥḥāk, 1 LES ETATS ARABES ET LE DROIT DE LA MER 123–30 (1986) (in French).
80. Declaration on the Maritime Zone, Aug. 18, 1952, 1006 U.N.T.S. 323.
81. S. N. Nandan, The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Historical Perspective, www.fao.org/
3/s5280T/s5280t0p.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2022).
82. The Declaration of Montevideo on the Law of the Sea, May 8, 1970, 9 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1081 (1970).
83. Nandan, supra note 81.
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Montevideo Declaration in approving the Lima Declaration. 84 The declaration repeated the principles of the Montevideo Declaration but added additional points, including coastal State authority to prevent contamination and
other harmful effects to the marine environment that may result from resource use, exploration, and exploitation in the area. 85
Two years later, fourteen Caribbean States—Barbados, Colombia, Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela—introduced
the concept of the patrimonial sea in the Declaration of Santo Domingo. 86
While repeating some of the features of the Montevideo and Lima Declarations, the Santo Domingo Declaration drew a clear distinction between State
sovereignty in the territorial sea and economic jurisdiction in the patrimonial
sea. This distinction included, inter alia, (1) granting coastal States sovereign
rights, not sovereignty, over the resources of the patrimonial sea; (2) indicating that the patrimonial sea was adjacent to the territorial sea; (3) limiting the
maximum breadth of the patrimonial sea to two hundred nautical miles; and
(4) preserving freedom of navigation and overflight for all ships and aircraft,
and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, in the patrimonial sea subject to the coastal State’s resource rights in the area. 87
That same year, in June, sixteen African nations adopted the Yaoundé
Conclusions, which mirrored many of the provisions of the Lima Declaration. 88 Recommendation I authorized States to establish an economic zone
(of an unspecified breadth but at least including the continental shelf) beyond the territorial sea over which the State would have “exclusive jurisdiction for the purpose of control regulation and national exploitation of the
living resources of the Sea and their reservation for the primary benefit of
their peoples and their respective economies, and for the purpose of the
prevention and control of pollution.” 89
84. Declaration of the Latin American States on the Law of the Sea, Aug. 8, 1970, 10
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 207 (1971).
85. A second point addressed in the declaration was coastal State authority over marine
scientific research (MSR) in the Area. See id.; Nandan, supra note 81.
86. Declaration of Santo Domingo, June 9, 1972, 11 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 892 (1972).
87. Other features addressed coastal State authority to protect the marine environment,
authority over MSR, and delimitation of overlapping areas. See id.; Nandan, supra note 81.
88. Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the
Law of the Sea, June 30, 1972, 12 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 210 (1973) [hereinafter Yaoundé Conclusions]; Nandan, supra note 81.
89. Yaoundé Conclusions, supra note 88, ¶ I(a)(3); Nandan, supra note 81.
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In February 1973, the Inter-American Juridical Committee adopted the
Organization of American States Resolution on the Law of the Sea. 90 Unfortunately, the resolution once again blurred the distinction between sovereignty and jurisdiction, indicating that coastal State “sovereignty and jurisdiction” extended beyond the territory, internal waters, and sea area “adjacent to its coasts to a maximum distance of 200 nautical miles, as well as to
the airspace above and the bed and subsoil of that sea.” 91 The Organization
of American States resolution was followed soon thereafter by the adoption
of the Addis Ababa Declaration by the Organization of African Unity. 92 The
declaration likewise provided, inter alia, for the establishment of an EEZ
beyond the territorial sea to a maximum breadth of two hundred nautical
miles, sovereignty over the living and non-living resources in the zone, and
management of the zone without undue interference from other legitimate
uses of the sea, such as freedom of navigation, overflight, and the laying of
cables and pipelines. 93
Nonetheless, despite these initiatives to define coastal authority beyond
the territorial sea as economic/resource-related in nature, between 1965 and
1975 the number of States claiming a two-hundred-nautical-mile territorial
sea subject to coastal State sovereignty grew from three to twenty-five nations. 94 This extension of sovereignty was driven by a desire of the less-developed States to offset their lack of capacity and capability to adequately
regulate, monitor, and exploit their two-hundred-nautical-mile zones. The
major maritime powers were, of course, concerned that these excessive
claims could adversely affect traditional high seas freedoms of navigation
and overflight beyond the territorial sea. Recognition of the EEZ as a new
maritime zone by the UNCLOS III participants resulted in an acceptable
solution to reconcile these competing interests and became an integral part
of the “package deal” of compromises reflected in the Convention. 95

90. O.A.S. Inter-American Juridical Committee Resolution on the Law of the Sea of
February 9, 1973, O.A.S. Doc. OAS/SER.G, CP/doc.262/73 rev. 1 (Mar. 21, 1973), 12
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 711 (1973).
91. The resolution also contained provisions regarding protection of the marine environment, coastal authority over MSR, and access to resources in the Area to land-locked
States. See id.; Nandan, supra note 81.
92. Declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the “Issues of the Law of the
Sea” of 2 July 1973, Doc. A/CONF.62/33, at 63 (July 19, 1974) (original French).
93. Id.; Nandan, supra note 81.
94. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22.
95. Nandan, supra note 81.
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The result was Part V of the Convention, which establishes an elaborate
legal regime for the EEZ that carefully balances coastal State economic interests and maritime State navigational interests. Article 56 grants coastal
States “sovereign rights” for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing the living and non-living natural resources of the waters
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil of the two-hundred-nautical-mile EEZ, as well as other activities related to the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy
from the water, currents, and winds. 96 States are also granted jurisdiction
over (1) the establishment and use of resource-related offshore artificial islands, installations, and structures; (2) marine scientific research (MSR); and
(3) protection and preservation of the marine environment, all of which have
a direct relationship with coastal States’ resource rights and economic interests. 97 Nonetheless, as a counterbalance, in exercising its rights and performing its duties in the EEZ, the coastal State shall have “due regard” to the
rights and duties of other States in the zone. 98
The Convention makes clear that coastal States do not exercise sovereignty over the EEZ. The terms “sovereign rights” and “jurisdiction” were
deliberately chosen to clearly distinguish between coastal State resource
rights and limited jurisdiction in the EEZ on the one hand, and coastal State
authority in the territorial sea on the other. Coastal States enjoy a much
broader and more comprehensive right of “sovereignty” in the territorial
sea. 99
Article 58 provides clarity to the rights and duties of other States in the
EEZ, providing that all States retain the high seas freedoms of “navigation
and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms.” 100 However,
in exercising their rights and performing their duties in the EEZ, States have
a similar “due regard” obligation to respect the rights and duties of the

96. UNCLOS, supra note 16, arts. 56, 57.
97. Id. arts. 56, 60, 220, & Part XIII.
98. Id.
99. 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 531–44 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1993) [hereinafter VIRGINIA COMMENTARY II].
100. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 58.
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coastal State. 101 The United States takes the position that enforcement of the
“due regard” requirement rests with the flag State, not the coastal State. 102
Article 58 further clarifies that the high seas provisions found in Section
1 of Part VII of the Convention—Articles 88 to 115—and other pertinent
rules of international law apply equally to the EEZ to the extent they are
compatible with the EEZ regime. 103 Thus, no State may claim “sovereignty”
over the EEZ. 104 Flag States retain exclusive jurisdiction over their flag vessels operating in foreign EEZs, subject to coastal State jurisdiction over violations of its fisheries laws and regulations. 105 Warships and other government-owned or operated non-commercial ships retain complete immunity
from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. 106 The flag State
or the State of nationality retain penal jurisdiction over the master and crew
in the event of a collision or other navigational incident in the EEZ, and only
the flag State can order the arrest and detention of the vessel. 107 All States
have a duty to render assistance to persons and ships in distress at sea in the
EEZ. 108 All States have a duty to prevent and punish the universal crimes of
slavery, 109 piracy, 110 and unauthorized broadcasting 111 in the EEZ, to include
the right of visit 112 and the right of hot pursuit. 113 Similarly, all States have a
duty to cooperate to suppress the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in the EEZ. 114 Finally, all States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, subject to the coastal
State’s resource rights and environmental jurisdiction. States shall also have

101. Id.
102. U.S. President’s Transmittal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI to the U.S. Senate with
Commentary (Oct. 7, 1994), reprinted in 34 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1393, 1411
(1995) (“It is the duty of the flag State, not the right of the coastal State, to enforce this ‘due
regard’ obligation”) [hereinafter U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS].
103. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 58.
104. Id. art. 89.
105. Id. arts. 73, 92.
106. Id. arts. 95, 96.
107. Id. art. 97.
108. Id. art. 98.
109. Id. art. 99.
110. Id. arts. 100–7.
111. Id. art. 109.
112. Id. art. 110.
113. Id. art. 111.
114. Id. art. 108.
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due regard to cables or pipelines already in position and the delineation of
the course for laying pipelines is subject to coastal State consent. 115
The concept of the EEZ has proven to be one of the Convention’s most
important pillars. By granting coastal States sovereign rights over the resources in the zone, the EEZ put an end to two hundred nautical mile territorial sea claims, thus preserving high seas navigational rights and freedoms
for all States seaward of the territorial sea. The institution of the EEZ has
achieved widespread acceptance, with over 125 States claiming economic or
fishing zones consistent with the Convention. Once a novelty, today it is
considered by the International Court of Justice to have become part of customary law. 116
The United States established a two hundred nautical mile EEZ consistent with UNCLOS in 1983 to “advance the development of ocean resources and promote the protection of the marine environment.” 117 The U.S.
proclamation specifically preserves “high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea” for all States in the U.S. EEZ. 118
From a U.S. perspective, the EEZ regime established in Part V properly
balances long-term coastal State and maritime State interests. As both a
coastal and maritime State, the United States benefits immensely in both respects. The United States enjoys one of the world’s largest and richest EEZs,
encompassing about 4.4 million square miles of ocean with abundant living
and non-living resources. 119 As a maritime nation, the United States depends
on free and open access to the world’s oceans for its national security and
economic interests. Part V of the Convention guarantees that U.S. military
and commercial ships and aircraft have critical navigational and related free-

115. Id. arts. 79, 112.
116. Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3).
117. Proclamation No. 5030, Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of America, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (Mar. 10, 1983); see also Department of State, Public Notice 2237,
Exclusive Economic Zone and Maritime Boundaries, Notice of Limits, 60 Fed. Reg. 43825
(Aug. 23, 1995).
118. Proclamation 5030, supra note 117.
119. The U.S. EEZ is second only to that of France (4.5 million square miles) if you
include the EEZs of its overseas departments and territories. See Geoffrey Migiro, Countries
with the Largest Exclusive Economic Zones, THE WORLD ATLAS (June 29, 2018), https://
www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-largest-exclusive-economic-zone s.html.
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doms in foreign EEZs, to include the right to engage in military-related activities without coastal State notice or consent, subject to the due regard obligation. 120
As discussed below in Section III(D), while a handful of States purport
to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZ, most States agree with the
U.S. position articulated at the conclusion of the UNCLOS III that:
All States continue to enjoy in the [EEZ] traditional high seas freedoms of
navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines,
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms,
which remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those freedoms
when exercised seaward of the zone. Military operations, exercises and activities have always been regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea.
The right to conduct such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States
in the exclusive economic zone. This is the import of Article 58 of the
Convention. 121

Thus, military activities, such as launching and landing aircraft, operating
military devices, intelligence collection, exercises, operations, emplacement
of listening or other security-related devices on the seabed, and military marine data collection (military surveys) are recognized historic high seas uses
that are preserved by Article 58 for all States, subject to the obligation to
have due regard to coastal State resource rights. 122
F. Marine Scientific Research
More than 80 percent of the world’s oceans remain unexplored and unmapped. 123 Nonetheless, each year scientists discover new species, like the
Apolemia (a large siphonophore), and new features, like the massive coral
reef pinnacle in the Great Barrier Reef. 124 The Convention promotes and
120. See generally U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1410–11.
121. 17 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE THIRD UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA 244, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 and ADD.1–2 (1984) (hereinafter Statement of
the United States, Third UN Conference).
122. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1411.
123. Kattie Hogge, 4 Recently Discovered Ocean Species, OCEAN CONSERVANCY BLOG (Jan.
22, 2021), https://oceanconservancy.org/blog/2021/01/22/5-recently-discovered-oceanspecies/.
124. Danielle Hall, The Top Ten Ocean Stories of 2020, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Dec.
17, 2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/top-ten-ocean-stories-2020180976558/.
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facilitates MSR throughout the various maritime zones, requiring States and
competent international organizations to cooperate in the development and
conduct of MSR. 125 Thus, the Convention has played a critical role in understanding and managing the marine environment and its resources.
The term “marine scientific research” is not defined in the Convention.
However, it generally refers to “those activities undertaken in the ocean and
coastal waters to expand knowledge of the marine environment and its processes.” 126 It includes “physical oceanography, marine chemistry, marine biology, fisheries research, scientific ocean drilling and coring, geological and
geophysical research, and other activities with a scientific purpose.” 127
States exercise sovereignty over their internal waters, territorial sea, and
archipelagic waters and therefore have the exclusive right to conduct MSR
in those waters. 128 Foreign-flag vessels transiting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters in innocent passage are prohibited from carrying out research
or survey activities without the consent of the coastal/archipelagic State. 129
Similarly, foreign ships engaged in transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes
passage may not carry out any research or survey activities in international
straits or archipelagic sea lanes without prior authorization of the bordering
States or the archipelagic State. 130
Given the interrelationship between MSR and marine environment protection and resource exploitation, research activities in the EEZ and on the
continental shelf require coastal State consent. 131 The researching State may
presume consent has been granted and may proceed with its research project
six months after the date it has provided the required information to the
coastal State unless, within four months of receiving the information, the
coastal State informs the researching State that consent is being withheld for
any of the reasons stated below. 132 This provision should encourage coastal
125. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 239.
126. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1439; see generally U.S. Department of State, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, Marine Scientific Research Consent Overview,
https://www.state.gov/marine-scientific-research-consent-overview/ (last visited Nov. 18,
2022).
127. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office of General Counsel,
Marine Scientific Research, https://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil_marine_research.html (updated
Dec. 9, 2020) [hereinafter NOAA, Marine Scientific Research].
128. UNCLOS, supra note 16, arts. 2, 49.
129. Id. arts. 19(2)(j), 52, 245.
130. Id. arts. 40, 54.
131. Id. arts. 56, 77, 246.
132. Id. art. 252.
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States to respond promptly to a request from the researching State. Beyond
the EEZ and continental shelf—the high seas and the deep seabed (the
“Area”)—all States and competent international organizations have a right
to conduct MSR. 133
In most cases, coastal States shall grant permission for MSR projects by
other States and competent international organizations to “increase scientific
knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all mankind.” 134
Consent may only be withheld if the MSR project:
a) is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural
resources . . . ;
b)involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives or the
introduction of harmful substances into the marine environment;
c) involves the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, installations and structures . . . ; [or]
d)contains information communicated [by the researching State] . . . regarding the nature and objectives of the project which is inaccurate or if
the researching State . . . has outstanding obligations to the coastal State
from a prior research project. 135

Thus, coastal State consent may not be arbitrarily withheld, thereby maximizing access for research activities while recognizing coastal State resource
interests.
If a coastal State lacks sufficient grounds to withhold consent, it can still
protect its interests against potential surreptitious activities—for instance, a
proposed MSR project that is a subterfuge to collect military intelligence
against the coastal State—by imposing conditions on the researching State.
For example, the coastal State may exercise its right to participate or be represented in the MSR project, especially on board the research vessel or scientific research installation without obligation to contribute to the cost of
the project. 136 The coastal State may also require the researching State to
provide it with preliminary reports, as well as with the final results and conclusions after the project is completed. 137 The coastal State may additionally
request the researching State to provide all data, which may be copied, and
portions of samples derived from the project, as well as an assessment of
133. Id. arts. 87, 256, 257.
134. Id. art. 246
135. Id.
136. Id. art. 249.
137. Id.
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such data, samples, and research results. 138 In this regard, the United States
requires submission of a copy of all data collected during a foreign research
project, as well as the project’s final report, to NOAA’s National Center for
Environmental Information. 139
States and competent international organizations shall publicize and disseminate knowledge resulting from their MSR activities. 140 This is consistent
with U.S. policy, which advocates the free and full disclosure of the results
of MSR. 141 Coastal States may, however, require their consent to release results of a project of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation
of natural resources in its EEZ or on its continental shelf. 142
The United States is a recognized leader in the conduct of MSR and has
consistently promoted maximum freedom for such research. Despite the
Convention’s provisions on coastal State jurisdiction over MSR in the EEZ,
the United States did not avail itself of that right in its 1983 Ocean Policy
Statement because of the U.S. interest in encouraging MSR and avoiding
unnecessary burdens. 143 However, in 2020, the United States amended its
MSR policy to increase maritime domain awareness and reduce potential exposure to security, economic, and environmental risks. The new policy requires advance consent for all cases of foreign MSR in the U.S. EEZ or on
its continental shelf. 144
The Convention’s MSR provisions are consistent with and advance U.S.
policy, which seeks to “develop, encourage, and maintain a coordinated,
comprehensive, and long-range national program” in MSR for the benefit of
mankind to assist in protecting health and property; enhancing commerce,
transportation, and national security; rehabilitating U.S. commercial fisheries; and increasing utilization of ocean resources. 145 U.S. MSR activities will
contribute to the following objectives: (1) accelerate development of ocean
resources; (2) expand human knowledge of the marine environment; (3) encourage private investment in exploration, technological development, marine commerce, and economic utilization of marine resources; (4) preserve
138. Id.
139. NOAA, Marine Scientific Research, supra note 127.
140. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 244.
141. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1438–39.
142. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 249(2).
143. Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Statement on United States Ocean
Policy, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 383 (Mar. 10, 1983).
144. Proclamation No. 10071, Revision to United States Marine Scientific Research
Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. 59165 (Sept. 18, 2020).
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1101.
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the role of the United States as a leader in MSR and resource development;
(5) advance education and training in marine science; (6) develop and improve the capabilities, performance, use, and efficiency of technology used
to explore, research, survey, recover resources, and transmit energy in the
marine environment; (7) effectively use scientific and engineering resources
in close cooperation between the public and private sectors to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and waste; and (8) cooperate with other nations
and international organizations in MSR activities. 146
Although the Convention does not define MSR, it distinguishes MSR
from other forms of non-resource-related data collection, such as hydrographic surveys (to enhance safety of navigation) and military marine data
collection (military surveys). For example, Article 19(2)(j) prohibits “research
and survey activities” for ships engaged in innocent passage. 147 Article 40
applies a similar restriction to ships engaged in transit passage, prohibiting
“marine scientific research and hydrographic survey ships” from carrying out
any “research or survey activities” without prior authorization of the States
bordering the strait. 148 The same prohibition applies to ships engaged in archipelagic sea lanes passage (Article 54) and ships transiting archipelagic waters in innocent passage (Article 52). 149 Finally, Article 56, Article 123, and
Part XIII only refer to MSR, and not to “survey” activities. 150 Thus, while
coastal/archipelagic States may prohibit ships engaged in innocent passage,
transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage from conducting “research
and survey” activities, they may only regulate foreign MSR in the EEZ. Hydrographic surveys and military marine data collection remain high seas freedoms seaward of the territorial sea.
G. Extended Continental Shelf
In 1958, the continental shelf was defined as “the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial
sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the

146. Id.
147. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 19.
148. Id. art. 40.
149. Id. arts. 52, 54.
150. Id. arts. 56, 123, & Part XIII.
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said areas.” 151 The description of the continental shelf beyond the depth of
two hundred meters—“to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas”—was imprecise, at best. Concerned that this ambiguity over the demarcation of the
shelf’s outer limits and the exploitation of its resources could lead to a new
wave of excessive maritime claims, the issue was thoroughly discussed and
resolved at UNCLOS III.
The result of the negotiations was Article 76, which clarifies the definition by (1) extending coastal State control over the shelf’s resources out to
two hundred nautical miles, to coincide with the outer limit of the EEZ and
satisfy the interests of the geologically disadvantaged States; and (2) providing a detailed formula based on geological criteria to determine the extent of
the shelf where its continental margin extends beyond two hundred nautical
miles from the coast, to satisfy the interests of the broad-margin States. 152
Thus, all States may claim a continental shelf of two hundred nautical
miles even if the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to
that distance. 153 Allowing all States to claim a two hundred nautical mile continental shelf places “virtually all sea-bed hydrocarbon resources under
coastal state jurisdiction.” 154 In situations where the continental margin extends beyond two hundred nautical miles, coastal States may claim an extended continental shelf (ECS) up to 350 nautical miles from the baseline or
100 nautical miles from the 2,500-meter depth, depending on geological criteria such as the thickness of sedimentary deposits. 155 The continental margin
includes “the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State,
and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise.” 156
It does not, however, “include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges
or the subsoil thereof.” 157

151. Convention on the Continental Shelf art.1, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
152. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 76; U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of
the Sea, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A Historical Perspective),
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2022).
153. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 76(1).
154. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1426.
155. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 76(4)–(6).
156. Id. art. 76(3).
157. Id.
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Notwithstanding the alternative maximum limits stated above, the outer
limit of the ECS shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the coast on submarine ridges, except that the 350-nautical-mile cap does not apply to “submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin,
such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs.” 158 The United States believes this exception applies to the hydrocarbon-rich Chukchi plateau and its
component elevations off north Alaska. During UNCLOS III, the U.S. delegation expressed support for Article 76(6) on the understanding that the
Chukchi plateau and its component elevations cannot be considered a ridge
and are covered by the exception to the 350-nautical-mile cap. No State objected to the U.S. statement. 159 In addition to the Arctic Ocean, the United
States can also potentially claim an ECS off its Atlantic coast, the Gulf of
Mexico, and the Bering Sea. 160
To ensure that ECS claims are consistent with the formula established
in Article 76, before establishing the outer limits of its ECS the coastal State
must first submit the particulars of its claim to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf along with “supporting scientific and technical
data.” 161 Based on the information provided, the Commission “shall make
recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment
of the outer limits of their continental shelf.” 162 The coastal State is not
bound by the Commission’s recommendations, but if it establishes the outer
limits of its continental shelf based on these recommendations, the delimitation shall be final and binding on all State parties and the International
Seabed Authority, thus providing stability to the claim. 163 If the coastal State
disagrees with the Commission’s recommendations, it must make a revised
or new submission to the Commission within a reasonable amount of
time. 164 As of October 2022, the Commission has received 93 submissions
and 9 revised submissions for review. 165

158. Id. art. 76(6).
159. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1427.
160. Id.
161. UNCLOS, supra note 16, Annex II, art. 4.
162. Id. art. 76(8) & Annex II, art. 6.
163. Id.
164. Id. Annex II, art. 8.
165. U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Submissions, Through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm
(last updated Oct. 25, 2022).
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To offset the potential economic effects of the ECS, coastal States shall
make annual payments or contributions in kind with respect to all exploitation of non-living resources at a site after the first five years of production
of the site. 166 Beginning in the sixth year, “the rate of payment or contribution shall be 1 per cent of the value or volume of production at the site.” 167
Thereafter, “the rate shall increase by 1 per cent for each subsequent year
until the twelfth year and shall remain at 7 per cent thereafter.” 168 Payments
or contributions are made to the International Seabed Authority, which is
responsible for distributing the funds to States parties to the Convention
based on equitable sharing criteria, taking into account the interests and
needs of developing States, in particular the least developed and land-locked
States. 169 Developing States that are a net importer of a mineral resource
produced from its ECS are exempt from making such payments or contributions with respect of that mineral resource. 170 U.S. government experts
believe that the required payments under Article 82 are a small percentage
of the total economic benefits derived by the coastal State from the resources
extracted at the site and clearly serve U.S. interests. 171 The U.S. oil and gas
industry likewise agrees that the revenue sharing requirement in Article 82
should not result in any additional cost to industry. 172
III.

FAILURES OF THE CONVENTION

A. Straight Baselines
Both the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and
the 1982 UNCLOS allow a coastal State, in limited circumstances, to draw
straight baselines along its coast from which its maritime zones are measured. The straight baseline provisions of the conventions are derived from

166. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 82(1)–(2).
167. Id. art. 82(2).
168. Id.
169. Id. art. 83(4).
170. Id. art. 83(3).
171. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1428.
172. Hearing on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Before the S. Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 108th Cong. 4 (Mar. 23, 2004) (statement of Paul L. Kelly,
Senior Vice President, Rowan Companies, Inc., on Behalf of the American Petroleum Institute, the International Association of Drilling Contractors, and the National Ocean Industries Association).
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the 1951 Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), which concerned a straight
baseline claim by Norway in the northern part of its mainland coast. 173
The International Court of Justice was asked to ascertain whether the
outer line of the “skjærgaard” that borders the western sector of the Norwegian mainland should be considered in delimiting Norway’s territorial sea.
The Court determined that the general rule of using the low-water mark to
delimit the territorial sea “may be applied without difficulty to an ordinary
coast, which is not too broken.” 174 However, where the coast is
deeply indented and cut into, as is that of Eastern Finnmark, or where it is
bordered by an archipelago such as the “skjærgaard” along the western sector of the [Norwegian] coast . . . , the base-line becomes independent of
the low-water mark, and can only be determined by means of a geometrical
construction. . . . Such a coast . . . calls for the application of a . . . method
of base-lines which, within reasonable limits, may depart from the physical
line of the coast. 175

The Court, however, determined that the use of straight baselines was not
unlimited, indicating that “the drawing of base-lines must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast” and that the sea
areas lying within the baselines are “sufficiently closely linked to the land
domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.” 176
Consistent with the Fisheries case, UNCLOS restates the general rule that
“the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the
low-water line along the coast.” 177 However, straight baselines may be used
instead of the low-water line “where the coastline is deeply indented and cut
into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.” 178 Nonetheless, the drawing of straight baselines “must not depart to
any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea
areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land
domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.” 179
In determining whether the conditions in Article 7(1) apply to a given
coastline, thus allowing for the use of straight baselines, UN experts agree
173. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).
174. Id. at 128.
175. Id. at 128–29.
176. Id. at 133.
177. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 5.
178. Id. art. 7(1).
179. Id. art. 7(3).
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that “it is necessary to focus on the spirit as well as the letter of the first
paragraph of Article 7.” 180 Although no objective test has been developed to
identify what constitutes a “deeply indented coast,” it is generally agreed
“that there must be several indentations which individually would satisfy the
conditions establishing a juridical bay . . . , though there may be other less
marked indentations associated with them.” 181 By judiciously establishing a
system of straight baselines, a coastal State may be able to “eliminate potentially troublesome enclaves and deep pockets of non-territorial seas without
significantly pushing seaward” territorial sea limits away from the coast. 182 In
short, “it is not the purpose of straight baselines to increase the territorial
sea unduly.” 183
Similarly, there is no uniform objective test that identifies what constitutes a fringe of islands along the coast—“states should be guided by the
general spirit of Article 7.” 184 Nevertheless, experts agree that “there must
be more than one island in the fringe” and islands “arranged like a steppingstone perpendicular to the coast” would not qualify. 185 A fringe of islands is
likely to exist in two situations: (1) islands that appear to form a unity with
the mainland, and (2) islands that mask a large portion of the coast. 186 The
fringe of islands must also be in the immediate vicinity of the coast. Experts
agree that a fringe twenty-four nautical miles from the coast would satisfy
the requirement—a fringe one hundred nautical miles from the coast would
not. 187
As a general rule, the United States believes that, to comply with these
requirements, SBL segments must (1) not “depart to any appreciable extent
from the general direction of the coastline,” by reference to general direction
lines that in each locality do not exceed sixty nautical miles in length; (2) not
exceed twenty-four nautical miles in length; and (3) result in sea areas situated
landward of the straight baseline segments that are “sufficiently closely
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.” 188
180. U.N. OFFICE FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, BASELINES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA ¶ 35, U.N. Sales No. E.88.V.5 (1989).
181. Id. ¶ 36.
182. Id. ¶ 38.
183. Id. ¶ 39.
184. Id. ¶ 42.
185. Id. ¶ 43.
186. Id. ¶¶ 44–45.
187. Id. ¶ 46.
188. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1403.
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UNCLOS further limits drawing straight baselines to and from low-tide
elevations, “unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently
above sea level have been built on them or” in cases where the drawing of
straight baselines to and from low-tide elevations “has received general international recognition.” 189 Straight baselines may also not be applied “in
such a manner as to cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high
seas or an [EEZ].” 190 Finally, when drawing straight baselines, consideration
must be given to “economic interests peculiar to the region . . . , which are
clearly evidenced by long usage.” 191
Straight baselines may also be used “where because of the presence of a
delta and other natural conditions the coastline is highly unstable” and
“across the mouth of a river between points on the low-water line of its
banks” if the “river flows directly into the sea.” 192 Finally, a straight baseline
that does not exceed twenty-four nautical miles, drawn between the lowwater marks of the natural entrance points of a juridical bay, can be used to
close off the bay. If the “distance between the low-water marks of the natural
entrance points . . . exceeds 24 [nautical miles],” a straight baseline of twentyfour nautical miles can “be drawn within the bay . . . to enclose the maximum
area of water . . . possible with a line of that length.” 193
Thus, one reason for allowing the use of straight baselines is to permit
coastal States to enclose waters that, because of their close relationship with
the land, have the character of internal waters. Coastal States may also use
straight baselines to “eliminate complex patterns, including enclaves, in its
territorial sea, that would otherwise result from the use” of the low-water
line. 194 Therefore, straight baselines are the exception, not the rule, and
should be used sparingly.
Objective and precise application of the Convention’s baseline rules
would prevent excessive claims. Nonetheless, despite mirroring the International Court of Justice decision in the Fisheries case, the straight baseline provisions are the most abused articles of the Convention by States seeking to
illegally expand their jurisdiction over waters adjacent to their coasts. Because maritime zones are measured from the baseline, excessive straight
baselines significantly extend coastal State jurisdiction seaward in a manner
189. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 7(4).
190. Id. art. 7(6).
191. Id. art. 7(5).
192. Id. arts. 7(2), 9.
193. Id. art. 10.
194. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1403.
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that is detrimental to freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful
uses of the sea. 195 Areas that were once territorial seas or high seas are now
considered by coastal States as internal waters where navigational rights do
not apply.
To meet the criteria of being “deeply indented and cut into,” the United
States considers that the coastline must meet all of the following characteristics: (1) there exists at least three deep indentations; (2) the indentations are
near one another; and (3) the depth of penetration of each indentation from
the proposed closing line at its entrance to the sea is greater than half the
length of the straight baseline segment. 196
The United States additionally considers that a “fringe of islands along
the coast in its immediate vicinity” must meet all the following requirements
before straight baselines can be drawn: (1) the most landward point of each
island lies no more than twenty-four nautical miles from the mainland; (2)
each island to which a straight baseline is to be drawn is not more than
twenty-four nautical miles apart from the island from which the straight
baseline is drawn; and (3) the islands, as a whole, mask at least 50 percent of
the mainland in any given locality. 197
Applying these international rules, the United States has rejected over
fifty straight baseline claims made by coastal States as inconsistent with UNCLOS and customary international law. 198 These illegal claims either (1) do
not meet the two geographic conditions in UNCLOS required for drawing
straight baselines; (2) enclose waters that do not have a close relationship
with the land but rather reflect the characteristics of territorial seas or high
seas; or (3) are inordinately long, well in excess of twenty-four nautical miles.
B. Mid-Ocean Islands Archipelagoes
As discussed above, only island nations that meet the water-to-land ratio of
Article 47 can claim archipelagic status. Continental States may not assert
archipelagic status for their claimed mid-ocean islands. Nonetheless, despite
the clear language in UNCLOS, several continental States illegally purport to
draw straight baselines around their claimed mid-ocean island territories and
dependencies. These claims are akin to an assertion of archipelagic status for
195. Id. at 7.
196. Id. at 9.
197. Id.
198. See MCRM, supra note 24.
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these features and are therefore inconsistent with contemporary international law.
China established straight baselines around the Paracel Islands in 1996. 199
In 2012, Beijing declared straight baselines connecting several features in the
Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Dao). 200 In both cases, the standards for drawing
what is, in effect, archipelagic baselines around these mid-ocean island
groups are not met. 201 The proper baseline is the low-water line of the various features. In addition to the United States, Japan has also protested
China’s straight baseline claim in the Senkakus, indicating that it is not
grounded in international law, including UNCLOS. 202
Denmark initially declared straight baselines that are, in effect, archipelagic baselines around the Faroe Islands in December 1976. 203 The United
States protested this illegal claim in 1991 and has conducted operational assertions challenging its validity under the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program. 204 Denmark slightly amended one of the straight baseline segments in
2002, but the claim remains inconsistent with UNCLOS. 205 Like Denmark,
199. Declaration of the Gov’t of the People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of
the Territorial Sea (May 15, 1996), https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATION
ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1996_Declaration.pdf.
200. Statement of the Gov’t of the People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of Diaoyu Dao and Its Affiliated Islands (Sept. 10, 2012), https://
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DEPOSIT/ch
n_mzn89_2012_e.pdf.
201. U.S. DEPT’ OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 117, STRAIGHT BASELINES CLAIM:
CHINA 8 (July 9, 1996).
202. Permanent Mission of Japan to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Note
Verbale PM/12/303, Sept. 24, 2012, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN NO. 80, at 39 (2013), http://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin80e.pdf.
203. Denmark, Ordinance No. 599 of 21 December 1976 on the Delimitation of the
Territorial Sea around the Faroe Islands, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DNK_1976_Ordinance599.pdf.
204. See MCRM, supra note 24.
205. See Gov’t of Denmark, Decree on the Coming into Force of the Act on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea for the Faroe Islands, Decree No. 240 (Apr. 30, 2002), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA,
LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN NO. 68, at 13 (2008); Decree to Amend the Decree on the
Fishing Territory of the Faroe Islands, Decree No. 241 (Apr. 30, 2002), in LAW OF THE SEA
BULLETIN NO. 68, supra, at 14; Exec. Ord. on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea of the
Faroe Islands, Exec. Ord. No. 306 (May 16, 2002), in LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN NO. 68,
supra, at 15.
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France also established straight baselines that are equivalent to archipelagic
baselines around New Caledonia. 206 These baselines do not meet the criteria
established in UNCLOS for the use of straight baselines and as a continental
State France may not establish archipelagic baselines around its mid-ocean
dependencies.
Ecuador designated straight baselines along part of its mainland coast
and around all the Galápagos Islands (Archipélago de Colón) in 1971. 207 The
straight baseline system consists of five points on or near the mainland and
eight points around the Galápagos Islands. Based on accepted State practice
and criteria established in international law for the drawing of straight baselines, U.S. experts concluded that the entire straight baseline system was
questionable and that archipelagic baselines could not be constructed around
the Galápagos. 208 The United States protested the archipelagic baselines
claim in 1986. 209 When Ecuador ratified UNLCOS in 2012, it filed a declaration reiterating, inter alia, the validity of Supreme Decree No. 959-A, which
established archipelagic baselines around the Galápagos. 210 The declaration
additionally confirmed that Ecuador “exercises full jurisdiction and sovereignty over the Galapagos Marine Reserve, . . . as well as over the Particularly
Sensitive Sea Area and the ‘area to be avoided’, both established by the International Maritime Organization.” 211 The United States has operationally
challenged these claims under the Freedom of Navigation Program, most
recently in 2014. 212
The 1920 Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Treaty grants Norway full and absolute
sovereignty over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen but provides free access and
206. See Gov’t of France, Decree Defining the Straight Baselines and Closing Lines of
Bays Used to Determine the Baselines from which the Breadth of the French Territorial
Waters Adjacent to New Caledonia is Measured, Decree No. 2002-827 (May 3, 2002), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA,
LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN NO. 53, at 58 (2004).
207. See Gov’t of Ecuador, Supreme Decree No. 959-A (June 28, 1971), https://
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ECU_1971_Decree.pdf (prescribing straight baselines for the measurement of the territorial sea).
208. U.S. DEPT’ OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, LIMITS IN THE
SEAS NO. 42, STRAIGHT BASELINES: ECUADOR 6, 8, 10 (May 23, 1972).
209. MCRM, supra note 24.
210. Declaration by Ecuador upon Ratification of the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea ¶ VI (Sept. 24, 2012), U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&
Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (scroll down the list to Ecuador).
211. Id. ¶ VIII.
212. MCRM, supra note 24.
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the right to engage in economic activities to the nationals of all parties to the
treaty. 213 On June 7, 2001, Norway deposited a list of geographical coordinates with the United Nations depicting the points for drawing straight baselines around Svalbard for measuring the width of the territorial sea. 214 These
illegal straight baselines have the practical effect of creating internal waters
that should be considered territorial seas and extending the territorial sea
around Svalbard into areas where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight would apply. As a continental State, Norway may not draw archipelagic
baselines around Svalbard.
In 1985, Portugal established straight baselines for the coasts of the islands of the Autonomous Region of the Azores. 215 When Portugal ratified
UNCLOS in 1997, it reaffirmed its rights under domestic law with respect
of the mainland and the archipelagos and islands incorporated therein, “for
the purposes of delimitation of the territorial sea, the continental shelf and
the exclusive economic zone.” 216 These straight baselines in effect establish
archipelagic baselines and are therefore inconsistent with international law.
The United States does not recognize these claims and protested them in
1986. 217
The United Kingdom has similarly drawn illegal baselines around the
Falkland Islands. The Falkland Territorial Sea Order establishes straight

213. Treaty Relating to Spitsbergen (Svalbard) arts. 1–3, Feb. 9, 1920, 43 Stat. 1892,
T.S. 686, 2 Bevans 269, 2 L.N.T.S. 7.
214. Gov’t of Norway, M.Z.N. 38, 2001, LOS (Maritime Zone Notification) June 8,
2001), Deposit by Norway of the List of Geographical Coordinates of Points Pursuant to
Art. 16, Para. 2, of the Convention, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION FOR OCEAN
AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, LAW OF THE SEA INFORMATION CIRCULAR (LOSIC)
NO. 14, at 34 (Oct. 2001); Gov’t of Norway, Regulations Relating to the Limits of the Norwegian Territorial Sea Around Svalbard, Laid Down by Royal Decree of 1 June 2001, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA,
LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN NO. 46, at 72 (2001).
215. Gov’t of Portugal, Decree-Law No. 495/85, art. 1 (Nov. 29, 1985), https://
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/PRT_1985_Decree.pdf.
216. Declaration by Portugal upon Ratification of the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea ¶ 1 (Nov. 3, 1997), U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.
un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Tem
p=mtdsg3&clang=_en#EndDec (scroll down the list to Portugal).
217. MCRM, supra note 24.
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baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea adjacent to the Falkland Islands is measured. 218 The straight baseline system is comparable to an
archipelagic baseline system. It employs twenty-two turning points to join
the outermost points of the outermost islands and reefs. Additionally, it
complies with the water-to-land ratio prescribed in Article 47 of UNCLOS. 219 As a continental State, the United Kingdom may not claim archipelagic status for its overseas mid-ocean dependencies.
UNCLOS is crystal clear—only island nations that meet the water-toland ratio stipulated in Article 47 can claim archipelagic status and draw archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands
and drying reefs of the archipelago. Thus, continental nations and island
States that do not meet the requirements of Article 47 may not assert archipelagic status for their claimed mid-ocean islands. Despite the unambiguous
UNCLOS language and the status of the above nations as parties to the Convention, UNCLOS has failed to deter these States from illegally drawing,
what are in effect, archipelagic baselines around their claimed mid-ocean
possessions. These claims have the potential of affecting adversely freedom
of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the seas.
C. Historic Bays
The emergence of the concept of “historic waters” originated in the unsettled status of international rules related to the maximum breadth of the territorial sea and the opening of bays. Given this uncertainty, States asserted
jurisdiction over areas adjacent to their coasts that were considered vital for
their national security and economic well-being. With the extension of the
territorial sea to twelve nautical miles, the creation of the two-hundred-nautical-mile EEZ, and a clear rule on closing lines for juridical bays, the rationale for claiming historic waters—security and economic concerns—no
longer exists. 220
Nonetheless, Article 10 of the Convention exempts historic bays from
the straight baseline requirement for juridical bays, which limits the closing
218. Gov’t of U.K., Falkland Islands (Territorial Sea) Order 1989 No. 1993, art. 3 (Nov.
1, 1989), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1989/1993/introduction/made.
219. Patrick H. Armstrong & Vivian L. Forbes, The Maritime Limits of the Falkland Islands,
1 BOUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN 73 (1993).
220. U.N. Secretariat, Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/143, ¶¶ 36, 81 (Mar. 9, 1962), reprinted in 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION 1962, at 1 (1964) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143].
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line to twenty-four nautical miles. 221 The Convention also recognizes in Article 15 that historic title can affect the delimitation of the territorial sea between two States with opposite or adjacent coasts. 222 Disputes involving historic bays or titles are also exempt from compulsory dispute settlement under Part XV. 223 The Convention fails, however, to provide guidance on the
criteria required to establish historic claims. As a result, several States continue to claim historic title over vast areas of the seas that adversely affect
freedom of navigation and overflight.
There is no uniform international standard for establishing a valid claim
to historic waters and bays. However, a 1962 study by the UN Secretariat
concluded that, based on State practice, there are three factors that should
be considered in determining whether a title to historic waters exists: (1) the
effective exercise of sovereignty over the area by the claiming State; (2) the
exercise of sovereignty by the claiming State must have continued over a
considerable time to have developed into a usage; (3) the attitude of foreign
States to the activities of the claiming State in the area must have been such
that it can be characterized as an attitude of general toleration. 224 The burden
of proof to establish these factors rests with the claiming State. 225 Repeating
these standards in the Convention could have influenced States to roll-back
their excessive historic waters claims.
First, to be effective, a claim of sovereignty must be “expressed by deeds
and not merely by proclamations.” 226 That does not mean that the claiming
State must take “concrete actions to enforce its laws and regulations” within
the claimed area. 227 However, it is essential that, to the extent action by the
claiming State is “necessary to maintain authority over the area, such action
was undertaken.” 228
Second, the activity from which the required usage emerges must be a
repeated or continued activity by the claiming State. In other words, the
claiming State “must have kept up its exercise of sovereignty over the area
for a considerable time.” 229 There is not consensus, however, on the exact
221. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 10.
222. Id. art. 15.
223. Id. art. 298.
224. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143, supra note 220, ¶¶ 185–86.
225. Id. ¶ 188.
226. Id. ¶ 98 (quoting Maurice Bourquin, Les baies historiques, in MÉLANGES GEORGES
SAUSER-HALL 43 (1952)).
227. Id. ¶ 99.
228. Id.
229. Id. ¶ 103.
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amount of time “necessary to build the usage on which the historic title” is
based. 230
Finally, the claiming State must show acquiescence by other States in the
claiming State’s exercise of sovereignty over the area in question. Nonetheless, acquiescence does not require that other States affirmatively consent to
the claim—to do so would render reliance on a historic title superfluous. 231
The study concluded that inaction by foreign States over a considerable period is sufficient to permit the emergence of a historic title. 232 This conclusion is consistent with the decision of the International Court of Justice in
the Fisheries case, which held that the consistent and prolonged application
of the Norwegian system of delimiting its fisheries zone, combined with the
general toleration of foreign States, gave rise to a historic right to apply the
system.
The general toleration of foreign States with regard to the Norwegian
practice is an unchallenged fact. For a period of more than sixty years the
United Kingdom Government itself in no way contested it. . . .
...
The Court notes that in respect of a situation which could only be
strengthened with the passage of time, the United Kingdom Government
refrained from formulating reservations. The notoriety of the facts, the
general toleration of the international community, Great Britain’s position
in the North Sea, her own interest in the question, and her prolonged abstention would in any case warrant Norway’s enforcement of her system
against the United Kingdom. 233

The United States takes the contrary view, requiring an “actual showing
of acquiescence” by foreign States to a historic claim, “as opposed to a mere
absence of opposition.” 234 In other words, an actual showing of acquiescence
requires a failure to protest what is clearly known to a foreign State as a
historical claim. Of the nineteen claims to historic bays, the United States
has protested and/or operationally challenged seventeen on the grounds that
they do not qualify as historic waters under international law. 235
230. Id. ¶ 104.
231. Id. ¶ 107.
232. Id. ¶¶ 110, 112.
233. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 138–39 (Dec. 18).
234. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1404; ROACH & SMITH, supra
note 22, at 19.
235. See MCRM, supra note 24.
914

Reflecting on UNCLOS Forty Years Later

Vol. 99

The Rio de la Plata Estuary was identified as a historic bay in a 1957 UN
study. 236 Four years later, Argentina and Uruguay issued a Joint Declaration
drawing a 120-nautical-mile straight baseline joining Punta del Este in Uruguay to Punta Rasa del Cabo San Antonio in Argentina, thereby enclosing
the Rio de la Plata Estuary as internal waters. 237 The closing line was reaffirmed in the 1973 Argentina-Uruguay maritime boundary agreement, 238 as
well as in Argentine domestic legislation in 1991. 239 Although none of the
aforementioned documents make specific reference to historic waters, both
Argentina and Uruguay consider the Rio de la Plata Estuary to be a historic
bay. Accordingly, the United States protested the claim in 1963. 240 The
United Kingdom (December 1961) and the Netherlands (June 1962) have
likewise protested the claim. 241
Australia asserted historic water claims for Anxious, Encounter,
Lacepede, and Rivoli Bays in two 1987 proclamations. 242 These claims were
reasserted in 2006 243 and 2016. 244 The United States protested these claims
in 1991, indicating that it was unaware that Australia had previously claimed
236. U.N. Secretariat, Historic Bays, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/1 (Sept. 30, 1957)
[hereinafter A/CONF.13/1].
237. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, LIMITS IN THE
SEAS NO. 44, STRAIGHT BASELINES: ARGENTINA 2 (Aug. 10, 1972).
238. Treaty Concerning the Rio de la Plata and the Corresponding Maritime Boundary,
Uru.-Arg., art. 1, Nov. 19, 1973, 1295 U.N.T.S. 293, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/URY-ARG1973MB.PDF.
239. Gov’t of Argentina, Act No. 23.968, arts. 1, 2 (Aug. 14, 1991), https://
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ARG_1991_239
68.pdf.
240. MCRM, supra note 24.
241. LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112, supra note 33, at 13.
242. Gov’t of Australia, Proclamation of 19 March 1987, Pursuant to Section 8 of the
Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/aus_1987_proclamation_sec8.pdf; Gov’t of Australia, Proclamation of 19 March 1987, Pursuant to Section 7 of the Seas and Submerged
Lands Act 1973, Table 1A, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONAND TREATIES/PDFFILES/aus_1987_proclamation_sec7.pdf.
243. Gov’t of Australia, Seas and Submerged Lands (Territorial Sea Baseline) Proclamation 2006, Schedule 2, Part 2 (Feb. 15, 2006), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2006L00525; Seas and Submerged Lands (Historic Bays) Proclamation 2006, §§ 5–9
(Feb. 15, 2006), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2006L00526.
244. Gov’t of Australia, Seas and Submerged Lands (Territorial Sea Baseline) Proclamation 2016, Schedule 2, Part 2 (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2016L00302; Seas and Submerged Lands (Historic Bays) Proclamation 2016, §§ 6–
10 (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2016L00301.
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these bays as historic and that the claim therefore did not rise to the level of
being open and notorious. 245 The U.S. protest also noted that none of these
bays were referenced in the 1957 UN study on historic bays, even though
the study mentioned other bays Australia had claimed as historic. 246
Cambodia and Vietnam signed an agreement in July 1982 that, inter alia,
claimed part of the Gulf of Thailand as historic waters located between the
coast of Kien Giang Province, Phu Quoc Island, and the Tho Chu islands
on the Vietnamese side and the coast of Kampot Province and the Poulo
Wai islands on the Cambodian side. 247 Pending further negotiations, the parties agreed that the 1939 Brévié Line would be used as the dividing line for
the islands within the historic waters. 248 The United States protested the
claim in 1987 indicating that the claim was first made internationally on July
7, 1982, notwithstanding the assertion that the waters had belonged to Vietnam and Cambodia for a “very long time.” 249 The brief period of time that
elapsed since the claim’s promulgation was “insufficient to meet the second
criterion for establishing a claim to historic waters” and did not permit sufficient time for acquiescence by the community of nations to mature. 250
Moreover, there is no evidence that Vietnam or Cambodia exercised effective authority over the claimed historic waters either before or after the date
of the agreement. Finally, the United States pointed out that it had not ac-

245. MCRM, supra note 24; ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22, at 39–41; Maritime Rights
and Freedoms of International Community, 1991–1999 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, vol. II, ch. 12, §A(4), at 1578–1580 (Sally J. Cummins &
David P. Stewart eds., 2005), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/1393
94.pdf (quoting from a telegram from the U.S. Dep’t of State to the U.S. Embassy in Canberra, dated Apr. 6, 1991, relating to the U.S. diplomatic protest of Australia’s historic bay
claims in South Australia).
246. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22, at 40; 1991–1999 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 245, at 1579; A/CONF.13/1, supra note
236, ¶ 43.
247. Ramses Amer & Nguyen Hong Thao, Regional Conflict Management: Challenges of the
Border Disputes of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 2 AUSTRIAN JOURNAL OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN
STUDIES, no. 2, 2009, at 53, 55.
248. Id.
249. LIMITS IN THE SEAS 112, supra note 33, at 13; United States Mission to the United
Nations at New York Note Dated June 17, 1987, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION
FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN NO. 10, at 23
(1987).
250. Id.
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quiesced in the claim and viewed the claim to be without foundation in international law. 251 Thailand, Singapore, and Germany have also protested the
claim. 252
The Dominican Republic claimed Escocesa Bay (between Cabo Francés
Viejo and Cabo Cabrón) and Santo Domingo Bay (between Punto Palenque
and Cabo Caucedo) as historic waters in 1952. 253 Neither bay, however, appears in the 1957 UN study on historic bays—only the Bays of Samaná,
Ocoa, and Neyba are listed in the Dominican entry. 254 So it is questionable
whether the claim was asserted in 1952. 255 The claim was, nonetheless, reaffirmed by the Dominican Republic in 1967 256 and 2007. 257 In 2007, the
United States and the United Kingdom filed a joint demarche objecting to
the claim pending further examination. 258 It is unclear why the United States
and United Kingdom waited forty years to object to the claim. Applying the
rationale of the Fisheries case, a tribunal could find that, given the notoriety

251. Id.
252. LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112, supra note 33, at 14; Letter Dated 9 December 1985
from the Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/40/1033 (Dec. 12, 1985).
253. See U.S. DEPT’ OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEA NO.
36, NATIONAL CLAIMS TO MARITIME JURISDICTION 44 (8th rev. May 25, 2000) (description
of Dominican Republic Law No. 3342 of July 13, 1952).
254. A/CONF.13/1, supra note 236, ¶ 43.
255. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, LIMITS IN THE
SEAS NO. 5, STRAIGHT BASELINES: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 5 (Jan. 25, 1970).
256. Dominican Republic, Act No. 186 of 13 September 1967 on the Territorial Sea,
Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf art. 2(1), https://
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DOM_1967_
Act.pdf.
257. Dominican Republic, Act 66-07, art. 7 (May 22, 2007), https://www.un.
org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/DOM_2007_Act_frombulletin65.pdf.
258. Text of a Joint Demarche Undertaken by the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America in Relation to the Law of the Dominican Republic Number 66-07 of 22 May 2007, Done on 18 October 2007, reprinted in
U.N., DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN NO. 66, at 98 (2007); U.S. DEPT’ OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 130, DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC: ARCHIPELAGIC AND OTHER MARITIME CLAIMS AND BOUNDARIES 16 (Jan. 31,
2014).
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of the claim and the prolonged abstention in contesting the claim, the Dominican Republic is entitled to enforce the claim against the United States
and the United Kingdom.
In June 1974, India and Sri Lanka entered into a bilateral agreement establishing a boundary line in the “historic waters” from Palk Strait to Adam’s
Bridge. 259 Two years later, India and Sri Lanka signed a second agreement
determining the maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf
of Mannar and the Bay of Bengal. 260 The parties agreed that each would excise sovereignty over the “historic waters” and territorial sea on its side of
the boundary. 261 The boundary in the Gulf of Mannar was adjusted in
1976. 262 Earlier that year, India enacted enabling legislation to specify the
limits of its historic waters. 263 In 2009, India provided notification to the
international community of the limits of its historic waters reflected in the
bilateral agreements with Sri Lanka in the Palk Strait, Palk Bay, and Gulf of
Mannar. 264 The United States first protested the claim in 1983 265 and conducted numerous operational challenges under the Freedom of Navigation
Program throughout the 1990s. 266
In 1977, Italy drew a closing line from Santa Maria di Leuca to Punta
Alice, claiming the Gulf of Taranto as historic waters. 267 The United States
259. Boundary in Historic Waters and Related Matters, India-Sri Lanka, art. 1, June 26,
1974, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/
TREATIES/LKA-IND1974BW.PDF.
260. Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Mannar and the Bay of Bengal and Related
Matters, India-Sri Lanka, art. 1, Mar. 23, 1976, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/LKA-IND1976MB.PDF.
261. Id. art. 5.
262. Supplementary Agreement on the Extension of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf
of Mannar from Position 13 M to the Trijunction Point Between Sri Lanka, India, and Maldives (Point T), India-Sri Lanka, (Nov. 22, 1976), https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/LKA-IND1976TP.PDF.
263. India, The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and
Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, Act No. 80 of 28 May 1976, art. 8(1), https://www.
un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/IND_1976_Act.pdf.
264. India, Notification of the Ministry of External Affairs of 11 May 2009 Concerning
the Baseline System, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND
THE LAW OF THE SEA, LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN NO. 71, at 26 (2010).
265. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22, at 43.
266. MCRM, supra note 24.
267. Italy, Decree of the President of the Republic No. 816 of 26 April 1977 Containing
Regulations Concerning the Application of Law No. 1658 of 8 December 1961 Authorizing
Accession to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Adopted at
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protested the claim in 1984, 1986, and 1987, indicating that Italy’s claim did
not meet the criteria for establishing a historic bay. 268 The United Kingdom
objected to the claim in 1981. 269
One of the most notorious historic bay claims is the Gulf of Sidra (Surt).
In 1973, Libya established a three hundred nautical mile closing line across
the gulf, along 32 degrees and 30 minutes parallel of north latitude, claiming
the entire gulf as internal waters based on historic title. 270 The United States
protested the action the following year, indicating that the claim did not meet
the requirements in international law for historic waters. The U.S. protest
also denounced the claim as a unilateral attempt by Libya to appropriate a
large portion of the high seas that would encroach on the long-standing principle of freedom of the seas. 271 In 1985, the United States reiterated its objection that the Gulf of Sidra constituted internal waters, rejecting the unlawful interference with freedom of navigation and overflight and other related high seas freedoms. 272 U.S. naval and air forces have additionally conducted numerous operational challenges to Libya’s illegal claim (1981–1984,
1986, 1997–1998, 2000, and 2013). 273 Libya’s claim has additionally been rejected by Australia (1981), France (1986), Germany (1986), Italy (1976), Norway (1986), Spain (1986), and the United Kingdom (1986). 274
Panama claimed sovereignty over the Gulf of Panama as a historic bay
in Law No. 9 of January 30, 1956. 275 Panama reiterated its claim when it
Geneva on 29 April 1958, and Giving Effect to that Convention, art. 1, https://
www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ITA_1977_Decree.pdf.
268. MCRM, supra note 24; see also ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22, at 44–45.
269. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22, at 45 n.22.
270. Libyan Arab Republic, Information Concerning the Jurisdiction of the Gulf of
Surt, Oct. 19, 1973, reprinted in United Nations, National Legislation and Treaties Relating
to the Law of the Sea, ST/LEG/SER.B/18, at 26 (1976).
271. See U.S. Dep’t of State File No. P74 0020-2088, 1974 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 293 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 1975); LIMITS IN THE
SEAS NO.112, supra note 33, at 17–18.
272. Communication Transmitted to the Permanent Missions of the States Members
of the United Nations at the Request of the Permanent Representative of the United States
to the United Nations (Ref. NV/85/11), July 10,1985, reprinted in United Nations, Division
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 6, at 40 (1985).
273. MCRM, supra note 24.
274. LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112, supra note 33, at 18; ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22,
at 45 n.25.
275. LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112, supra note 33, at 18; ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22,
at 49.
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ratified UNCLOS in 1996, declaring that the waters were a historic Panamanian bay with a two hundred kilometer imaginary closing line joining Punta
Mala and Punta de Jaqué. 276 A similar declaration was made in 2003 when
Panama ratified the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, asserting sovereignty over the gulf that was by nature and
history a Panamanian bay, with an area of about thirty thousand square kilometers. 277 Both Colombia 278 and Costa Rica 279 acknowledge the existence
of the claim and have not objected. The United States protested the validity
of the claim in 1956 and again in 1988, indicating that the Gulf of Panama
does not qualify as a historic bay under international law because it was not
based on a long-standing claim and had not received the requisite treatment
by the international community. 280 Moreover, there was no evidence that the
gulf had been recognized as a historic bay when Panama separated from Colombia in 1903, nor had anything occurred since 1903 that would confer the
gulf the character of a historic bay. 281
In 1957, the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) first claimed Peter the Great Bay as
a historic bay. 282 In 1984, the U.S.S.R. declared straight baselines along much
of its coast, including a 106-nautical-mile closing line across Peter the Great

276. Declaration by Panama upon Ratification of the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, July 1, 1996, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtd
sg3&clang=_en (scroll down to entry for Panama); Panama, Law No. 38 of 4 June 1996
Ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, https://www.un.org/
depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/PAN_1996_Law.pdf.
277. Declaration by Panama upon Ratification of the 2001 UNESCO Convention on
the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (with Annex), May 20, 2003, 2562
U.N.T.S. 9 (2012).
278. Treaty on the Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas and Related Matters,
Colom.-Pan., art. 3, Nov. 20, 1976, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATION
ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/PAN-COL1976DM.PDF.
279. Treaty Concerning Delimitation of Marine Areas and Maritime Cooperation,
Costa Rica-Pan., art. 3, Feb. 2, 1980, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATION
ANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/CRI-PAN1980MC.PDF.
280. LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112, supra note 33, at 19; MCRM, supra note 24.
281. LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112, supra note 33, at 19.
282. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 107, STRAIGHT BASELINES:
U.S.S.R. 4 (Sept. 30, 1987).
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Bay, thus renewing the claim that these waters were a historic bay. 283 The
United States protested the Soviet claim in 1957 and 1958. Canada (1957),
France (1957), Germany (1958), Japan (1958), the Netherlands (1957), Sweden (1957), and the United Kingdom (1957) also protested the claim at that
time. 284 In May 1982, the USS Lockwood (FF 1064) was navigating in the bay
and was ordered to leave the area by Soviet naval units. The Soviet unlawful
interference with freedom of navigation prompted the United States to renew its objection that Peter the Great Bay did not qualify as a historic bay
under international law. 285 The U.S. Navy has operationally challenged this
illegal claim on multiple occasions, the most recent in November 2020 by
the USS John S. McCain (DDG 56). 286
In addition to the Gulf of Thailand discussed above, Vietnam also claims
sovereignty over the portion of the Gulf of Tonkin that appertains to Vietnam as historic waters. 287 In analyzing the claim, the Geographer of the
U.S. Department of State noted that the occurrence of claims to historic bays
that are shared by more than one State is not common and, at a minimum,
all States bordering the bay must agree that the bay is a historic bay. 288 There
is no evidence, however, that China, which also borders the gulf, claims it as
historic waters. 289 The United States protested the claim in December 1982,
stating that the international standards for establishing a claim to historic

283. Id. at 5; U.S.S.R., Declaration Concerning Baselines for Measuring the Breadth of
the Territorial Sea, the Economic Zone, and the Continental Shelf of the USSR of the Continental Coastline and Islands of the Pacific Ocean, the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk,
and the Bering Sea, Feb. 7, 1984, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONAND
TREATIES/PDFFILES/RUS_1984_Declaration.pdf.
284. LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 107, supra note 282, at 4–5; LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112,
supra note 33, at 19.
285. LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112, supra note 33, at 19–20.
286. USS John S. McCain Conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation, COMMANDER, U.S.
SEVENTH FLEET PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2425878/uss-john-s-mccain-conducts-freedom-of-navigationoperation/; MCRM, supra note 24.
287. Statement of 12 November 1982 by the Government of the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam on the Territorial Sea Baseline of Viet Nam, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/VNM_1982_Statement.pdf.
288. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, LIMITS IN THE
SEAS NO. 99, STRAIGHT BASELINES: VIETNAM 11–12 (Dec. 12, 1983).
289. Id. at 12.
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waters have not been met and that, therefore, there is no basis in international law for Vietnam’s claim. 290 France (1983) and Thailand (1985) have
also protested the claim. 291
By acknowledging the existence of historic bays and historic waters but
failing to provide adequate guidance on the criteria necessary to establish
such claims under international law, the Convention encourages States to
make excessive claims that significantly restrict freedom of navigation and
overflight over broad expanses of the oceans. Moreover, exempting such
claims from compulsory dispute settlement reassures States that their excessive claims cannot be challenged, thereby upending the careful balance between coastal State and user State rights that is the hallmark of the Convention.
D. Residual Rights in the EEZ (Article 59)
Although it is ambiguous, Article 59 purportedly provides a basis to resolve
disputes regarding the rights and duties not specifically allocated to coastal
or other States by Articles 55, 56, and 58, and other provisions of the Convention.
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction
to the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone,
and a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other
State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and
in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the
international community as a whole. 292

Given the functional nature of the EEZ, where economic interests are concerned, equity would normally favor the coastal States; on non-resource uses,
the interests of other States would presumably predominate. 293 Nonetheless,
this ambiguity allows coastal States to abuse their rights and duties by claiming residual rights in the EEZ that are clearly inconsistent with the balance
290. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22, at 53.
291. Id.; Letter Dated 9 December 1985 from the Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. Doc.
A/40/1033 (Dec. 12, 1985).
292. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 59.
293. Nandan, supra note 81.
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of interests that led to the establishment of this new maritime zone. Particularly, it has paved the way for coastal States to illegally assert jurisdiction
over non-resource-related activities in the EEZ, to include a right to restrict
foreign military activities.
Post-UNCLOS, restrictions on military activities in the EEZ have replaced the two-hundred-nautical-mile territorial sea as the new antithesis to
freedom of navigation and overflight. Eighteen States purport to regulate
foreign military activities in their EEZs. These States include Bangladesh,
Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Cape Verde, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya,
Malaysia, the Maldives, Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Portugal, Thailand, and Uruguay. 294 Illegal constraints imposed by these
States on foreign military activities vary from State-to-State and include:
restrictions on “non-peaceful uses” of the EEZ without consent, such
as weapons exercises;
• limitations on military marine data collection (military surveys) and hydrographic surveys without prior notice or consent;
• requirements for prior notice or consent for transits by nuclear-powered vessels or ships carrying hazardous and dangerous goods, such as oil,
chemicals, noxious liquids, and radioactive material;
• limitations on warship transits to innocent passage;
• prohibitions on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations;
• restrictions on navigation and overflight through the EEZ;
• requirements for prior permission for warships to enter the EEZ;
• application of domestic environmental laws and regulations to sovereign immune vessels; and
• requirements that military aircraft file flight plans prior to transiting the
EEZ. 295
•

These excessive claims have no basis in customary international law or State
practice and are clearly at odds with the reassurances in Article 56(2) and
294. MCRM, supra note 24. Indonesia and the Philippines have not enacted domestic
legislation restricting foreign military activities but have on occasion objected to such activities in their EEZ. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Military Activities In and Over the Exclusive Economic
Zone, in FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS, AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 235, 237 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2009).
295. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: East Asia Focus,
90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 514, 524 (2014).
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Article 86 that the freedoms enjoyed by all States in respect of non-resourcerelated activities in the EEZ are not abridged. Accordingly, the United States
has diplomatically protested and routinely conducts operational assertions
challenging the validity of these claims.
UNCLOS reaffirms that all nations have an absolute right under international law to conduct military activities beyond the territorial sea of another State. The EEZ, which comprises nearly 38 percent of the world’s
oceans that were previously considered high seas, was created for the sole
purpose of granting coastal States greater control over the resources adjacent
to their coasts. 296 Efforts by a few nations to expand coastal State authority
in the EEZ to include residual competencies were rejected by most of the
delegations present at UNCLOS III. 297 Most nations agreed that military activities “have always been regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea”
and the “right to conduct such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all
States in the exclusive economic zone.” 298
Thus, the negotiations focused on “ensuring that the regime of the high
seas would apply in the EEZ to the extent it was not incompatible with Part
V.” 299 It was agreed that “the rights as to resources belong to the coastal
State and, in so far as such rights are not infringed, all other States enjoy the
freedoms of navigation and communication.” 300 During the negotiations,
Ambassador Koh, President of UNCLOS III, instructed the delegates to
draw a clear distinction “between the rights of the coastal state and the rights
of the international community” in the EEZ and to ensure that coastal State
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ were “compatible with wellestablished and long-recognized rights of communication and navigation.” 301
The final text of Article 86 recognizes the EEZ as a sui generis regime but
retains the distinction that had previously existed between the territorial sea
and the high seas by confirming that nothing in the article abridges the high
seas “freedoms enjoyed by all States in the EEZ in accordance with Article

296. VIRGINIA COMMENTARY II, supra note 99, at 491–821.
297. Id. at 529–30.
298. Statement of the United States, Third UN Conference, supra note 121, at 244.
299. 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 63–64 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1995).
300. Id. at 64.
301. Id. at 64–65.
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58.” 302 Restrictions on military activities only apply in the territorial sea (Articles 2, 19, 20), archipelagic waters (Articles 49, 52), international straits (Articles 39, 40), and archipelagic sea lanes (Article 54).
Also, nothing in UNCLOS grants coastal States authority over the airspace above the EEZ, which is considered international airspace and is
therefore not subject to coastal State sovereignty. 303 Article 3 of the Chicago
Convention exempts State aircraft from the rules of the convention, including compliance with Flight Information Region procedures beyond national
airspace. State aircraft operating in the airspace over the EEZ and the high
seas are only required to operate with due regard for the safety of navigation
of civil aircraft. 304 Efforts by Brazil to designate the airspace above the EEZ
as national airspace were rejected by the International Civil Aviation Organization Legal Committee, indicating that the proposal flagrantly contradicted
UNCLOS, which equates “the EEZ . . . with the high seas as regards freedom of overflight.” 305
For the foreseeable future, some coastal States will continue to assert
authority to regulate military activities in and over the EEZ. By raising the
political and military costs of such activities, these States seek to pressure
nations to remain outside the EEZ. If the position of these nations becomes
the international standard, 38 percent of the world’s oceans that were once
considered high seas and open to unfettered military use will come under
coastal State control. Such an outcome was not part of the package deal negotiated during UNCLOS III that allowed for the establishment of the EEZ.
To paraphrase a speech by Ambassador Koh in 2008—a few States want
to equate the legal status of the territorial sea and EEZ, while many other
States believe that coastal State rights in the EEZ are limited to exploitation
of the resource and that the water column should be treated similar to the
high seas. He then went on to say, “I find a tendency on the part of some
coastal States . . . to assert their sovereignty in the EEZ . . . is not consistent
with the intention of those of us who negotiated this text and is not consistent with the correct interpretation of [Part V] of the Convention.” 306 Yet
302. Id. at 60–71.
303. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S.
No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
304. Id. art. 3.
305. BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE
NEW LAW OF THE SEA 203 (1989).
306. Tommy T.B. Koh, Remarks on the Legal Status of the Exclusive Economic Zone, in FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAW OF SEA CONVENTION 53, 54-55
(Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2009).
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there is no indication that any of the aforementioned States intend to rollback their excessive EEZ claims.
E. Prior Notice/Consent and Innocent Passage
In preparation for the negotiations of the 1958 Conventions, the International Law Commission drafted provisional articles concerning, inter alia, the
regime of the territorial sea. Draft Article 25, adopted in 1955, provided that
coastal States could “make the passage of warships through the territorial sea
subject to previous authorization or notification” except in “straits normally
used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas.” 307 The
Commission expressed the view, however, that warships should normally
not be required to “request special authorization for each passage” and that
coastal State authorization should be provided “in general terms giving vessels the right of passage” provided warships comply with coastal State laws
and regulations. 308
The International Law Commission reconsidered the issue in 1956 and
approved a new Article 24, which also allowed coastal States to condition
innocent passage of warships through the territorial sea “to previous authorization or notification” but required coastal States to normally grant passage
subject to compliance with Articles 17 (Rights of Protection of the Coastal
State) and 18 (Duties of Foreign Ships During Their Passage). 309 The Commission noted that, even though “a large number of States do not require
previous authorization or notification,” that did not mean that a “state would
not be entitled to require such notification or authorization if it deemed it
necessary to take this precautionary measure.” 310 The International Law
Commission reasoned that the “passage of warships through the territorial
sea of another state can be considered by that state as a threat to its security.” 311 Therefore, the Commission was “not in a position to dispute the

307. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventh Session, U.N. Doc.
A/2934 (1955), reprinted in [1960] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
19, 41.
308. Id.
309. Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. on the Work of Its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/3159
(1956), reprinted in [1957] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 253,
276.
310. Id. at 277.
311. Id.
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right of states to take such a measure.” 312 However, prior notification or consent could only be required if the coastal State had enacted and duly published a restriction to that effect.
Notwithstanding the International Law Commission’s preparatory work,
the diplomatic conference did not adopt the language of draft Article 24.
Instead, Article 14 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention simply provides
that “ships of all States . . . shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through
the territorial sea” and passage is considered innocent “so long as it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state.” 313 Article 23 allows the coastal State to require a foreign warship to leave its territorial sea if the warship “does not comply with the regulations of the coastal
state concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance which is made to it” by the coastal State. 314 Thus, it
appears that a prior notice or consent requirement was rejected by a majority
of the delegations present at UNCLOS II.
The issue was revisited during UNCLOS III. An attempt by a few States
to include a prior notification or authorization requirement failed to receive
sufficient support during the negotiations, so the proponents agreed not to
press the proposed amendment to Article 21. 315 At the conclusion of UNCLOS III, Ambassador Koh confirmed on the record that “the Convention
is quite clear on this point. Warships do, like other ships, have a right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea, and there is no need for warships to acquire the prior consent or even notification of the coastal State.” 316
As a result, UNCLOS Articles 17, 19, and 30 contain virtually identical language found in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention.
Despite the unambiguous rejection of the prior notification or consent
requirement in the 1958 and 1982 conventions, the number of States that
condition the passage of warships on prior notice or consent has proliferated. In 1958, there were only seven States that conditioned innocent passage
of warships on prior notice or consent. 317 By 1991, the number had grown
to 47, with only four States rolling back their excessive claims after 1982. 318
312. Id.
313. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 26, art. 14.
314. Id. art. 23.
315. VIRGINIA COMMENTARY II, supra note 99, at 195–99.
316. Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 24 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 809, 854 n.159 (1984).
317. LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112, supra note 33, at 61.
318. Id.; ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22, at 250–51 tbl.11.
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Thus, nearly one-quarter of the parties to UNCLOS purport to condition
the right of innocent passage of foreign warships in the territorial sea on
prior notification or consent. 319
This trend is clearly inconsistent with UNCLOS, Article 17, which on its
face applies to all ships, including military and other sovereign immune vessels. The right of innocent passage of warships is further confirmed by Article 19, which contains a list of military activities that are prohibited when
ships are engaged in innocent passage, such as weapons exercises, intelligence collection, and launching or recovering aircraft or military devices.
Lack of notification or consent is not one of the listed proscribed activities.
This creates a presumption that warships not engaged in one of the prohibited activities automatically enjoy the right of innocent passage. Article 19
would be unnecessary if warships were not entitled to exercise the right. By
failing to specifically address the issue in Article 17, UNCLOS has contributed to this disturbing trend.
F. Dispute Settlement
Part XV of the Convention establishes an elaborate dispute settlement
mechanism, which includes both voluntary and compulsory procedures. Parties are required to settle their disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention by peaceful means, whether that is through voluntary mechanisms of their own choice or through compulsory mechanisms
provided in UNCLOS. 320 When a dispute arises, State parties shall expeditiously exchange views regarding its settlement. 321 The parties to the dispute
can also agree to submit the matter to conciliation. 322
If the parties cannot settle the dispute, the matter shall be referred to
ITLOS, the International Court of Justice, an Annex VII arbitral tribunal, or
an Annex VIII special arbitral tribunal for certain categories of disputes, for
compulsory resolution. 323 Non-voting experts may be employed by the court
or tribunal to assist in the deliberations. 324 A court or tribunal can also prescribe provisional measures to preserve the respective rights of the parties to
the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment, pending
319. MCRM, supra note 24; LIMITS IN THE SEAS NO. 112, supra note 33, at 62.
320. UNCLOS, supra note 16, arts. 279–82.
321. Id. art. 283.
322. Id. art. 284.
323. Id. arts. 286–88.
324. Id. art. 289.
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a final decision. 325 In cases involving the detention of a foreign flag vessel by
another State, the court or tribunal may order the prompt release of the vessel and its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial
security. 326 Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal shall be final and
binding on the parties to the dispute. 327
Certain disputes, however, are exempt from these compulsory procedures. A State is not obligated to accept compulsory dispute settlement for
any disagreement concerning the coastal State’s right or discretion to withhold consent for an MSR project in its EEZ in accordance with Article
246(5) or to order suspension or cessation of a project in accordance with
Article 253. 328 Additionally, a coastal State is not required to accept compulsory procedures for any dispute related to its sovereign rights with respect to
the living resources in the EEZ, including its discretionary powers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the allocation of surpluses
to other States, and the terms and conditions established in its conservation
and management laws and regulations. 329
When signing, ratifying, or acceding to the Convention, or at any time
thereafter, a State may declare in writing that it does not accept compulsory
procedures regarding: (a) disputes concerning maritime boundary delimitations or those involving historic bays or titles; (b) disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by sovereign immune vessels and
aircraft, and disputes concerning law enforcement activities regarding the
exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from compulsory dispute settlement under Article 297(2) or (3); or (c) disputes where the UN
Security Council is exercising its functions under the UN Charter, unless
otherwise authorized by the Council. 330
These elaborate procedures are designed and intended to resolve disputes peacefully and expeditiously, as well as enhance compliance with the
Convention’s provisions. They also recognize the importance of certain national interests by allowing States to exempt matters, such as military and law
enforcement activities, from compulsory dispute settlement. Nonetheless,
even though decisions of a court or tribunal are intended to be final and

325. Id. art. 290.
326. Id. art. 292.
327. Id. art. 296.
328. Id. art. 297(2).
329. Id. art. 297(3).
330. Id. art. 296.
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binding on the parties to the dispute, the procedures lack one important feature—an enforcement mechanism.
Take, for example, the South China Sea arbitration case between China
and the Philippines. On January 22, 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitration
proceedings against China pursuant to UNCLOS, Articles 286 and 287, and
Article 1 of Annex VI. The Philippines requested the tribunal to determine
the validity of China’s claimed historic rights and maritime entitlements in
the South China Sea, the status of the maritime features and the maritime
entitlements these features can generate, and the lawfulness of certain Chinese actions that allegedly violated UNCLOS.
Both States are parties to UNCLOS and are therefore subject to the
compulsory dispute settlement provisions of the Convention. Nonetheless,
China rejected the arbitration and refused to participate in the proceedings,
claiming that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. 331 The tribunal
convened a hearing in July 2015 and rendered an Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility on October 29, 2015, finding that it had jurisdiction over the
dispute. 332
The tribunal convened the hearing on the merits from November 24–
30, 2015, rejecting China’s arguments that the dispute was about territorial
sovereignty and maritime boundary delimitation. 333 The tribunal found that
a dispute concerning whether a State is entitled to a maritime zone is a distinct matter from the delimitation of maritime zones in an area in which they
overlap. The tribunal issued a unanimous award in favor of the Philippines
331. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to the Republic of the Philippines,
Note Verbale No. (13) PG-039 (Feb. 19, 2013) (available at Annex 3 in volume 2 of the
Memorial of the Philippines (Mar. 30, 2014), submitted in the South China Sea Arbitration
(Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb.)); Position Paper of the Government of
the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (Dec. 7, 2014), reprinted in 15 CHINESE
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 431 (June 2016).
332. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015).
333. “The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not accept any of the
procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention [compulsory dispute
settlement] with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) [maritime delimitation] (b) [military and law enforcement activities] and (c) [functions of the UN
Security Council] of Article 298 of the Convention.” Declaration of China upon Ratification
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Aug. 25, 2006), U.N.
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en#EndDec (scroll down to
entry for China).
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on July 12, 2016. 334 Consistent with the Convention’s compulsory procedures, the tribunal did not consider or rule on any question of sovereignty
over land territory and did not delimit any maritime boundary between the
parties.
The tribunal noted that the award was binding and that both parties had
an obligation to comply with its decision. 335 Nevertheless, China issued a
statement following the hearing stating that the award was “null and void”
and had “no legal binding force.” 336 Thus, what could have been a seminal
case in helping resolve the long-standing South China Sea dispute has further
aggravated the situation and has weakened the rule of law.
G. Ice-Covered Areas
Article 234 provides special rules for protecting and preserving the marine
environment in ice-covered areas like the Arctic. It authorizes coastal States
to
adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered
areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly
severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for
most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation,
and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or
irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. 337

These laws and regulations must have “due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.” 338 In addition, they must be “consistent with other

334. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 296, Annex VII art. 11.
335. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, Award, ¶¶ 1195–
1201 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086.
336. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on
the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines (July 12, 2016), http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379492.shtml.
337. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 234.
338. Id.
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relevant provisions of the Convention and international law, including the
exemption for vessels entitled to sovereign immunity in Article 236.” 339
Article 234 was purportedly negotiated directly between Canada, the Soviet Union, and the United States to provide a legal basis for implementing
the provisions of the 1970 Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act
to commercial and private vessels, while at the same time protecting U.S.
national security interests in preserving navigational rights and freedoms
throughout the Arctic. 340 Unfortunately, Article 234 has allowed Russia and
Canada to turn the Arctic Ocean into a Russian-Canadian lake.
The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is defined in Article 14 of the 1998 Federal Act of the Russian Federation, as amended by Article 2 of Federal Law
No. 132-FZ:
Navigation in the waters of the Northern Sea Route, a historically established national transport communication route of the Russian Federation, shall be carried out in accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law, the international treaties of the Russian Federation, this Federal Law, and other federal laws, as well as regulations issued in accordance with them. 341

Article 3(3) of the 2012 law also amended the Code of Commercial Navigation of the Russian Federation adding, inter alia, a new Article 5, which defines the waters of the NSR as the water that adjoins the northern littoral of
the Russian Federation, comprising the internal maritime waters, territorial
sea, contiguous zone, and EEZ of the Russian Federation. 342
Guidelines for navigating through the NSR ensure safety of navigation
and protection of the marine environment, and include:
1) procedures for navigation of vessels;
2) rules for icebreaker pilotage of vessels;
339. 4 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 396 (Shabtai Rosenne & Alexander Yankov eds., 1993) [hereinafter VIRGINIA COMMENTARY IV]; U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1419.
340. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1419; VIRGINIA COMMENTARY
IV, supra note 339, at 393, 398.
341. Russia, Federal Law No. 132-FZ of July 28, 2012, On Amendments to Certain
Legislative Enactments of the Russian Federation concerning State Regulation of Commercial Navigation in the Waters of the Northern Sea Route (U.S. State Department translation
reprinted in MCRM, supra note 24, entry for Russian Federation 2021).
342. Id. art. 3(3).
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3) rules for pilotage of vessels by an ice-qualified pilot;
4) rules for pilotage of vessels along routes in the NSR;
5) guidelines on navigational-hydrographic and hydrometeorological
support;
6) rules for radio communication; and
7) other guidelines pertaining to organization of navigation of vessels. 343
Applications to obtain a permit to navigate through the NSR shall be
submitted to the NSR Administration. Permits are issued on the “condition
that the vessel fulfills the requirements pertaining to safe navigation and protection of the marine environment” that are established by the international
treaties and laws of the Russian Federation and the aforementioned rules. 344
Vessels will also submit documents certifying that they possess “insurance
or other financial guarantee of civil liability . . . for harm resulting from pollution or for other harm caused by the vessels.” 345
The United States protested the NSR regulatory scheme on May 29,
2015. The U.S. diplomatic note objected to several provisions, including: (1)
a requirement to obtain permission to enter and transit the Russian EEZ and
territorial sea and provide certification of adequate insurance; (2) characterization of international straits that form part of the NSR as internal waters;
(3) characterization of the NSR as a “historically established national
transport communication route”; and (4) the “lack of any express exemption
for sovereign immune vessels.” 346
The United States also encouraged the Russian Federation to “submit
relevant aspects of the scheme to the International Maritime Organization
. . . for consideration and adoption.” 347 In particular, “the provisions . . . to
use routes prescribed by the . . . [NSR] Administration, [to] use icebreakers
and ice pilots, and [to] abide by other related measures . . . in straits used for
international navigation, are measures that must be approved and adopted
by the IMO.” 348

343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Russia–Northern Sea Route, 2015 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 12, §A(5)(c), at 526 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., undated).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 537–38.
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The U.S. note additionally questioned the scope of the NSR area and
whether the entire area, particularly the western portion, is ice-covered for
most of the year, as required by Article 234. Moreover, as the Arctic continues to warm, the note observed that “the use of Article 234 as the basis for
the scheme” becomes more untenable. 349 The United States also sought confirmation that the NSR scheme does not apply to sovereign immune vessels
(Article 236), and clarification on whether the provisions for the use of Russian icebreakers and ice pilots were mandatory. The United States believes
that Article 234 does not support the imposition of mandatory icebreaker or
pilotage requirements, that the exclusion of the use of foreign-flagged icebreakers is inconsistent with the non-discrimination aspects of Article 234,
and that the charges levied for these services are of concern. 350
The Russian Federation announced new rules for the NSR in March
2019 that are more problematic. The new rules require foreign warships and
naval auxiliaries to provide forty-five days advance notice and obtain permission to transit the NSR. 351 The advance notice must include the ship’s “name,
purpose, route, timetable, and technical specifications, as well as the military
rank and identity of its captain.” 352 Foreign ships are also required to take a
Russian pilot on board before transiting through the Arctic and transit can
be denied without explanation. Unauthorized transits can result in the arrest
or destruction of the non-compliant vessel. Russian authorities cite Article
234 and national security concerns as their legal authority for the new
measures, which are clearly inconsistent with international law, including
UNCLOS. 353
Canada’s Arctic mandatory ship reporting system is equally problematic
and has been challenged by the United States and several other nations. 354
The Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations (NOR-

349. Id. at 527.
350. Id.
351. Alexey Kozachenko et al., Cold Wave: Foreigners Created the Rules of Passage of the
Northern Sea Route, IZVESTIA (Mar. 9, 2019), https://iz.ru/852943/aleksei-kozachenko-bogdan-stepovoi-elnar-bainazarov/kholodnaia-volna-inostrantcam-sozdali-pravila-prokhodasevmorputi.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. See Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone, 2010 DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW , ch. 12, §A(4)(a), at 514-19 (Elizabeth R. Wilcox ed., 2011) [hereinafter 2010 U.S. DIGEST]; ROACH & SMITH, supra note 22, at 492–95.
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DREGs) took effect on July 1, 2010, in Canadian-claimed waters of the Arctic. 355 The regulations have two main elements. First, they establish the
NORDREGs Zone that covers Canada’s claimed northern waters, extending up to two hundred nautical miles. A vessel may not enter, leave, or proceed within the zone unless it has previously obtained a clearance from Canadian authorities. Noncompliant persons and vessels are liable to a monetary fine and/or imprisonment. Second, the regulations establish a mandatory ship reporting system within the zone. Canada cites Article 234 as the
legal basis for the regulations.
The United States protested the regulations in August 2010, indicating
that the NORDREGs are “inconsistent with important law of the sea principles related to navigational rights and freedoms” and recommending that
Canada submit the system to the IMO for adoption. 356 The United States
noted that the prior permission requirement to enter and transit the EEZ
and territorial sea, as well as the enforcement provisions for noncompliance,
were inconsistent with navigational rights and freedoms in the EEZ, the
right of innocent passage in the territorial sea, and the right of transit passage
through straits, such as the Northwest Passage, used for international navigation. Moreover, conditioning transit on prior permission is inconsistent
with Article 234, which requires coastal State laws and regulations to have
due regard to navigation. The United States also expressed concern that the
NORDREGs did not contain an express exemption for sovereign immune
vessels and that any enforcement action would be inconsistent with international law, including Article 236 of UNCLOS. 357
The United States also expressed concerns that Canada’s unilateral imposition of mandatory ship reporting and mandatory ship routing should be
submitted to the IMO for adoption consistent with Chapter V, Regulations
10 and 11 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). 358 In September 2010, the United States and International Association

355. See Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations, SOR/2010-127
(June 10, 2010), https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Regulations/SOR-2010-127/.
356. Diplomatic Note from the U.S. to Canada Commenting on Canada’s Proposed
NORDREGS (Mar. 19, 2010), reprinted in 2010 U.S. DIGEST, supra note 354, at 515, 516–
18.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 517.
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of Independent Tanker Owners made a joint submission to the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee expressing concern over the NORDREGs. 359 In
particular, the joint submission highlights that the mandatory ship reporting
system applies to ships seeking to enter and transit Canada’s EEZ and it is
therefore inconsistent with SOLAS V/11 and V/12. Beyond the territorial
sea, SOLAS does not permit coastal States to unilaterally adopt mandatory
ship reporting systems. The IMO is the only international body competent
to develop guidelines and criteria for regulations of ship reporting systems
on an international level. Similarly, vessel traffic services may only be made
mandatory in a State’s territorial sea.
H. Fisheries Jurisdiction
Given that nearly 90 percent of living marine resources are harvested within
two hundred nautical miles of the coast, UNCLOS placed most living marine
resources under the jurisdiction of coastal States. This grant of management
authority was heralded by the coastal States as a boon to their economic
growth and food security. Article 56 grants coastal States sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing living
resources within the EEZ. 360 This authority includes the right to determine
the allowable catch of all living resources in the EEZ, based on the best
scientific evidence available, to ensure that these resources are not endangered by over-exploitation. 361 A coastal State is required to promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in the EEZ. If the
coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch,
it shall give other States access to the surplus. 362 Special rules apply to the
conservation and management of straddling fish stocks (Article 63), highly
migratory species (Article 64), marine mammals (Article 65), anadromous
stocks (Article 66), and catadromous species (Article 67).
To ensure compliance with its fishery laws, a coastal State is authorized
to take a broad range of enforcement measures, to include boardings, inspections, vessel position reporting, embarked observers, and arrests and
359. See Submission of the United States & International Association of Independent
Tanker Owners to the IMO, Safety of Navigation: Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services
Zone Regulations, IMO Doc. MSC 88/11/2 (Sept. 22, 2010); ROACH & SMITH, supra note
22, at 493 n.139.
360. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 56.
361. Id. art. 61.
362. Id. art. 61.
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fines. 363 Despite these broad authorities, coastal States have failed to adequately conserve and manage living resources within their EEZs because
they lack the necessary maritime domain awareness and maritime law enforcement capacity and capabilities.
The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization assesses that marine fish
stocks have steadily declined since the mid-1970s. According to the Organization’s 2020 State of the World Fisheries report, “the proportion of fish
stocks that are within biologically sustainable levels decreased from 90 percent in 1974 to 65.8 percent in 2017 . . . , with 59.6 percent classified as being
maximally sustainably fished stocks.” 364 The “percentage of stocks fished at
biologically unsustainable levels increased from 20 percent in 1974 to 34.2
percent in 2017.” 365 Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing exacerbates the depletion of fish stocks and further threatens the sustainability
of coastal State fisheries and fragile ecosystems. 366 The value of global fish
production in 2018 was estimated at $401 billion, 367 but 20 percent of global
fish catch results from IUU fishing resulting in billions of dollars in lost revenue every year. 368 Rather than create the controversial International Seabed
Authority to regulate futuristic mining of deep seabed minerals, UNCLOS
III would have been better off creating an organization similar to the International Seabed Authority to regulate world fisheries beyond the territorial
sea.
I. Environmental Protection
UNCLOS has been touted as “the strongest comprehensive environmental
treaty now in existence or likely to emerge for quite some time.” 369 Part XII
establishes an unprecedented legal framework and basic obligation to protect
the marine environment from all sources of pollution, including vessel363. Id. arts. 62, 73.
364. U.N. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 2020: SUSTAINABILITY IN ACTION 7 (2020) [hereinafter STATE
OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 2020].
365. Id.
366. U.S. COAST GUARD, ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING STRATEGIC OUTLOOK (Sept. 2020), https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/iuu/IUU_Strategic_Outlook_20 20_FINAL.pdf.
367. STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 2020, supra note 364.
368. U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Fishwatch: U.S. Seafood
Facts (2020), https://www.fishwatch.gov/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2022).
369. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1414.
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source pollution, ocean dumping, seabed activities, and land-based
sources. 370 By addressing all sources of marine pollution, the Convention
“compels parties to come together to address issues of common and pressing concern” that will promote continued improvement in the health of the
world’s oceans. 371
All States have a general duty to protect and preserve the marine environment. 372 More specifically, States shall take measures necessary to ensure
that activities under their jurisdiction or control do not cause marine pollution using the best practicable means at their disposal. 373 Part XII additionally
provides an elaborate framework for global and regional cooperation (Articles 197–201), promoting scientific and technical assistance (Articles 202–
203), monitoring the risks and effects of pollution through environmental
assessments (Articles 204–206), and adopting domestic laws and regulations
to implement international rules and standards (Articles 207–212).
States also have the right and obligation to enforce compliance with
measures adopted to preserve and protect the marine environment. The
Convention provides express enforcement provisions for pollution from
land-based sources (Article 213), seabed activities (Article 214), activities in
the Area (Article 215), ocean dumping (Article 216), vessels (Articles 217–
220), maritime casualties (Article 221), and from or through the atmosphere
(Article 222). 374
States are required to fulfil their international obligations concerning the
protection and preservation of the marine environment and will be held liable in accordance with international law. 375 In this regard, States shall ensure
that recourse is available under their domestic laws for “prompt and adequate compensation or other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution
of the marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction.” 376 Part XII is without prejudice to specific obligations States may
have under other conventions or agreements related to protection and
preservation of the marine environment (e.g., the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships). 377
370. Id. at vi, ix.
371. Id.
372. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 192.
373. Id. arts. 194, 196.
374. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1417.
375. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 235.
376. Id.
377. Id. art. 237.
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Nonetheless, of critical importance to the United States and other seagoing nations, the provisions of UNCLOS “regarding the protection and
preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval
auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for
the time being, only on government non-commercial service.” 378 The only
requirement is that States shall ensure, “by the adoption of appropriate
measures not impairing operations or operational capabilities of such vessels
or aircraft owned or operated by it, that such vessels or aircraft act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable,” with UNCLOS. 379
Despite this elaborate framework, UNCLOS has failed in its objective to
protect and preserve the marine environment. The world’s oceans are more
polluted today than ever before. According to the U.S. National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, “billions of pounds of trash and other pollutants enter the ocean” each year because of littering, poor waste management
practices, storm water discharge, or natural events such as tsunamis and hurricanes. 380 Some of the debris ends up on the beach, some sinks to the ocean
floor, some is eaten by fish and marine animals mistaking it for food, and
some collects in ocean gyres formed by rotating ocean currents. Ingestion of
plastics or entanglement in derelict fishing gear can result in the death of
marine species. Contaminants, such as heavy metals and microplastics, can
also accumulate in seafood, making it harmful for human consumption. In
this regard, over one-third of shellfish-growing waters in the United States
are negatively affected by coastal pollution. 381
Oil and chemical spills also continue to impact the wellbeing of the
oceans. Over 80 percent of pollutants, however, come from land-based activities that result in runoff. Nonpoint sources of pollution can include septic
tanks, storm water discharge, vehicles, farms, livestock ranchers, fertilizer
from yards, and timber harvest areas. Excessive amounts of nitrogen and
phosphorus in a body of water, for example, can trigger algal blooms—an
overgrowth of algae. These harmful algal blooms, known as red tides, can
produce toxic effects that harm marine life. Excess nutrients in the water can

378. Id. art. 236.
379. Id.
380. U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Ocean Pollution and Marine
Debris, https://www.noaa.gov/education/resource-collections/ocean-coasts/ocean-pollution (last updated April 1, 2020).
381. Id.
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also cause dead zones (hypoxia). As algae sinks and decomposes, the decomposition process reduces the level of oxygen in the water causing marine
species to die or leave the area. 382
In short, while the Convention may have raised awareness of the adverse
effects of marine pollution, human activities continue to threaten the health
of the world’s oceans and UNCLOS has done little to curb that threat. Despite the obligation imposed on States parties to protect and preserve the
marine environment, more than 50 percent of land-based plastic-waste leakage originates from just five parties to the Convention—China, Indonesia,
the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. 383 Concerted action by these five
States alone, imposed through compulsory dispute settlement, could reduce
global leakage of plastic waste into the ocean by 45 percent by 2025. 384
J. Declarations and Statements
When signing, ratifying, or acceding to UNCLOS, Article 310 allows States
to make declarations or statements regarding application of the Convention
that do not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions
of the Convention. 385 In other words, reservations to the treaty’s provisions
are not permitted. Notwithstanding the clear language of Article 310, several
States have made declarations or statements that effectively constitute reservations limiting the scope of the Convention. The two most prevalent areas
include innocent passage of warships and military activities in the EEZ.
Despite the negotiating history of the Convention and the precise language of Article 17 that guarantees the right of innocent passage to all ships,
eighteen States made declarations or statements reserving the right to condition innocent passage of foreign warships on prior notice or consent.
These States include Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Cabo Verde, Chile,
China, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Iran, Malta, Montenegro, Oman,
Romania, Serbia, Sweden, and Yemen. Similarly, the travaux préparatoires of
the Convention, long-standing State practice, and UNCLOS Article 56 support the conclusion that military activities that are consistent with Article
2(4) of the UN Charter may be conducted in foreign EEZs without notice
382. Id.
383. Stemming the Tide: Land-Based Strategies for a Plastic-Free Ocean, OCEAN CONSERVANCY 7 (Sept. 2015), https://oceanconservancy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/full-report-stemming-the.pdf.
384. Id. at 3.
385. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 310.
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or consent. Yet, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Ecuador, India, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Thailand, and Uruguay made declarations or statements purporting
to have the authority to regulate all military activities in the EEZ.
The Convention was negotiated and accepted as a “package deal.” These
declarations and statements are contrary to the plain language of Article 310,
undermine the legitimacy of the Convention, and weaken the rule of law for
the oceans.
IV.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

UNCLOS has profoundly influenced the development of the law of the sea.
Some of that influence has been good, some has been bad. But overall, the
Convention carefully balances the interests of coastal States in controlling
activities off their coasts with those of all States in preserving freedom of
navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the seas
without undue interference.
That explains why all U.S. administrations since the modification of Part
XI in 1994 have supported U.S. accession to UNCLOS. As both a coastal
State with one of the largest and richest EEZs in the world and the world’s
preeminent naval power, the United States will benefit by becoming a party
to UNCLOS. The three primary benefits inherent in the Convention include:
• UNCLOS advances U.S. interests as a global maritime power by preserving the right of U.S. naval and air forces and commercial vessels engaged
in maritime trade to access the world’s oceans to advance U.S. national security and economic interests.
• UNCLOS advances U.S. coastal State interests by providing exclusive
sovereign rights to the living and non-living resources in the EEZ and on
the continental shelf.
• The deep seabed mining regime in Part XI was fundamentally changed
to appease the United States and other industrialized nations, satisfactorily
addresses all of President Reagan’s 1982 objections, and now provides an
acceptable, stable regime for mining deep seabed minerals if such activities
occur in the future. 386

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has led efforts
to develop a “widely accepted international framework governing uses of the
386. U.S. Commentary on UNCLOS, supra note 102, at 1398.
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seas.” 387 UNCLOS achieves that objective. Granted, U.S. accession to the
Convention will not make excessive claims fade away overnight. There will
always be States that will purport to assert competencies and authorities at
sea that are inconsistent with long-standing international norms.
China, for example, is a serial violator of the Convention despite being a
party since 1996. 388 Virtually all its domestic maritime laws and regulations
are inconsistent with UNCLOS and customary international law. China’s recent refusal to observe the 2016 decision of the arbitral tribunal in the South
China Sea arbitration case reconfirms Beijing’s disdain for the international
rules-based legal order codified in the Convention and its propensity to disregard its international legal obligations.
China claims illegal straight baselines along its mainland coast, around
the Paracel Islands, and portions of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Most of
China’s mainland coast does not meet the geographic criteria in Article 7 for
establishing straight baselines. Moreover, as a continental State, China’s use
of archipelagic straight baselines to enclose the Paracels and Senkakus is
clearly inconsistent with Articles 46 and 47. China also claims the Gulf of
Bohai (Pohai) and the Hainan (Qiongzhou) Strait as internal historic waters.
Yet, neither claim meets the criteria for establishing a valid claim to historic
waters.
Contrary to Article 17, China illegally conditions the right of innocent
passage of foreign warships on prior consent. Beijing also unlawfully claims
security jurisdiction in its contiguous zone, contrary to the precise language
of Article 33, which limits coastal State competencies in the zone to customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitary matters. China additionally purports to regulate foreign military activities in the EEZ, which is inconsistent with Article
58, long-standing State practice, and the negotiating history of the Convention. Similarly, China’s 2002 Surveying and Mapping Law illegally asserts jurisdiction over all marine data collection in its EEZ even though Article 56
only grants coastal States exclusive jurisdiction over MSR. Finally, China’s
attempt to regulate overflight of its EEZ by establishing an Air Defense
Identification Zone in international airspace in the East China Sea has no
basis in UNCLOS, the Chicago Convention, or customary international law.
China’s flagrant disregard of the international legal order and unsettling
pattern of coercive behavior undermines the rule of law and the liberal order
of the world’s oceans. As the world’s preeminent maritime power, the United
387. Id. at 1400.
388. Raul “Pete” Pedrozo, China’s Legacy Maritime Claims, LAWFARE (July 15, 2016),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-legacy-maritime-claims.
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States can best help counterbalance China’s egregious maritime claims and
disdain for international norms and standards by becoming a party to UNCLOS. By joining the Convention, the United States will be in a better position to ensure that the law of the sea is interpreted and evolves in a way that
preserves the rules-based legal order that has brought peace and stability to
the world’s oceans.
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